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− | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>The national grid system may be publically or privately owned or combine both in a public-private partnership. Common public-private models for grid systems include: | + | | style="width: 616px;" | |
| + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>The national grid system may be publically or privately owned or combine both in a public-private partnership. Common public-private models for grid systems include: |
| + | |
| *Publically owned generation and transmission, and privately owned distribution;<br/> | | *Publically owned generation and transmission, and privately owned distribution;<br/> |
| *Independent Power Producers (IPP) connected to a publically owned transmission/distribution system). | | *Independent Power Producers (IPP) connected to a publically owned transmission/distribution system). |
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− | National energy planning is key to establishing the economically optimum extent of the grid. Institutional restructuring, regulatory reform and policy and target setting may all be beneficial in creating the institutional and policy basis for grid extension. Capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors involved in grid extension lack capacity. Technology development/adoption and adoption of appropriate technical standards can enable grid extension at lower cost (as shown in the [[NAE Case Study: Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology|NAE Case Study:Tunisia]] where adoption of standards allowing MALT (Mise A La Terre) distribution lowered costs), while demand promotion may be needed to increase revenues and make it economically sustainable. <br/> | + | National energy planning is key to establishing the economically optimum extent of the grid. Institutional restructuring, regulatory reform and policy and target setting may all be beneficial in creating the institutional and policy basis for grid extension. Capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors involved in grid extension lack capacity. Technology development/adoption and adoption of appropriate technical standards can enable grid extension at lower cost (as shown in the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Tunisia,_Low_Cost_Distribution_Technology|Tunisia NAE Case Study]] where adoption of standards allowing MALT (Mise A La Terre) distribution lowered costs), while demand promotion may be needed to increase revenues and make it economically sustainable. <br/> |
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| |} | | |} |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> |
− | Mini-grids require substantial, long-term, capital investment and hence a regulatory framework which will give developers, and particularly private financiers, confidence that there will be a market for electricity from the mini-grid for a long enough period to repay and provide an adequate return on their investment. Larger systems may require concessions (which protect against competition over a designated area and time period) to give investors the confidence in revenue forecasts to commit the long-term capital investment needed. For smaller mini-grids, with lower and shorter-term capital investment, a licensing regime (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be more appropriate, with greater flexibility and a generally less demanding process balancing lack of protection from competition for the investor, while still providing the means to protect users through price/tariff regulation and setting technical and safety standards. Mini-grids below a certain size (eg <100kW in Tanzania), are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, and the right to operate instead being granted through a general derogation from regulation. | + | Mini-grids require substantial, long-term, capital investment and hence a regulatory framework which will give developers, and particularly private financiers, confidence that there will be a market for electricity from the mini-grid for a long enough period to repay and provide an adequate return on their investment. Larger systems may require concessions (which protect against competition over a designated area and time period) to give investors the confidence in revenue forecasts to commit the long-term capital investment needed. For smaller mini-grids, with lower and shorter-term capital investment, a licensing regime (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be more appropriate, with greater flexibility and a generally less demanding process balancing lack of protection from competition for the investor, while still providing the means to protect users through price/tariff regulation and setting technical and safety standards. Mini-grids below a certain size (eg <100kW in the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Tanzania,_Mini-Grids_Regulatory_Framework|Tanzania NAE Case Study]]), are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, and the right to operate instead being granted through a general derogation from regulation. |
| | | |
| Under any regulatory regime a key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited by the terms of the concession, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. mini-grid licensees have less protection from grid extension than concessionaires, but even where there is no formal concession it is often beneficial to establish a compensation regime in the event of grid extension, to encourage private mini-grid investment in the interim. | | Under any regulatory regime a key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited by the terms of the concession, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. mini-grid licensees have less protection from grid extension than concessionaires, but even where there is no formal concession it is often beneficial to establish a compensation regime in the event of grid extension, to encourage private mini-grid investment in the interim. |
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| == Relevante Case Studies: == | | == Relevante Case Studies: == |
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− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Brazil,_Luz_para_Todos_(Light_for_All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Cambodia_“Light_Touch”_Regulation|Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation|Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Kenya,_Off-Grid_for_Vision_2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Mali,_Rural_Electrification_Programme|Mali, Rural Electrification Programme]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Mali, Rural Electrification Programme|Mali, Rural Electrification Programme]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Nepal,_Rural_Energy_Development_Programme|Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme|Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Philippines,_Islanded_Distribution_by_Cooperatives|Philippines, Islanded Distribution by Cooperatives]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Philippines, Islanded Distribution by Cooperatives|Philippines, Islanded Distribution by Cooperatives]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Rwanda,_Sector-Wide_Approach_to_Planning|Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning|Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Tanzania,_Mini-Grids_Regulatory_Framework|Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework|Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework]]<br/> |
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| <br/> | | <br/> |
− |
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| = Standalone Systems = | | = Standalone Systems = |
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− | '''<span><span>A system for generating and supplying electricity to a single user (separate from any distribution system).</span></span>''' | + | '''<span><span>A system for generating and supplying electricity to a single user (separate from any distribution system).</span></span>'''<br/> |
− | Standalone systems may use any locally available source of energy (including solar, wind, hydropower, biogas, biomass, biofuels or diesel generators). While these include fossil-fuel based generation, technology advances combined with environmental concerns mean that policy-makers are increasingly focussing on encouraging Renewable Energy based generation. They may serve a single purpose (such as lighting or irrigation water-pumping) or be designed to meet all the electricity needs of the user. They range in size from solar lanterns, through small household systems to larger installations serving industrial enterprises (though for the purposes of this review the focus is on systems suitable for households, community facilities and SMEs).<br/> | + | |
| + | '''<span><span></span></span>'''Standalone systems may use any locally available source of energy (including solar, wind, hydropower, biogas, biomass, biofuels or diesel generators). While these include fossil-fuel based generation, technology advances combined with environmental concerns mean that policy-makers are increasingly focussing on encouraging Renewable Energy based generation. They may serve a single purpose (such as lighting or irrigation water-pumping) or be designed to meet all the electricity needs of the user. They range in size from solar lanterns, through small household systems to larger installations serving industrial enterprises (though for the purposes of this review the focus is on systems suitable for households, community facilities and SMEs).<br/> |
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| |} | | |} |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> |
− | Standalone systems are most frequently supplied to users through a purely private-sector chain of manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers. In a number of cases (such as the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh), public-private partnership models have been used. In general this has been through use of public finance (grants, subsidies and loans) to enhance affordability and support market growth, though there could be benefits in certain circumstances for government energy agencies to become directly involved in the standalone system market, by forming a joint entity to supply systems or by taking on one of the roles along the value chain (eg providing a distribution service for all system providers). More rarely a purely public model is used to provide standalone systems to users, for example where the grid company provides standalone systems to those it is not economic to connect to the grid (eg in South Africa). <br/> | + | Standalone systems are most frequently supplied to users through a purely private-sector chain of manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers. In a number of cases (such as shown in the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Bangladesh,_IDCOL_Solar_Home_Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]]), public-private partnership models have been used. In general this has been through use of public finance (grants, subsidies and loans) to enhance affordability and support market growth, though there could be benefits in certain circumstances for government energy agencies to become directly involved in the standalone system market, by forming a joint entity to supply systems or by taking on one of the roles along the value chain (eg providing a distribution service for all system providers). More rarely a purely public model is used to provide standalone systems to users, for example where the grid company provides standalone systems to those it is not economic to connect to the grid (eg in [[NAE_Case_Study:_South_Africa,_Integrated_National_Electrification|NAE Case Study South Africa]]). <br/> |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> |
− | Standalone system providers are rarely subject to regulation (beyond general business licensing requirements), though they may be required to meet certain standards in order to access subsidies and tax exemptions. In part this reflects policy-makers’ perception of them as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers, but also that without long-term fixed capital investment, private companies have not needed the protection of a concession or license to attract private capital (and would regard it simply as a regulatory burden). Concessions for standalone systems may however, as in Peru, be used to bring standalone system companies into a market which they might otherwise be unwilling to enter by protecting them from competition (though the long-term risks of market distortion under such an arrangement should be carefully considered). Standalone systems may also be included as one means of providing electricity within an integrated electricity concession also encompassing mini-grid and/or grid system access. It’s also possible that with standalone system providers increasingly looking to pay-as-you-go arrangements, where they retain ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even over its full life with the user simply paying for electricity used, regulating electricity supply through standalone systems may become more appropriate. | + | Standalone system providers are rarely subject to regulation (beyond general business licensing requirements), though they may be required to meet certain standards in order to access subsidies and tax exemptions. In part this reflects policy-makers’ perception of them as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers, but also that without long-term fixed capital investment, private companies have not needed the protection of a concession or license to attract private capital (and would regard it simply as a regulatory burden). Concessions for standalone systems may however, as in [[NAE_Case_Study:_Peru,_Concession_Model_for_Standalone_Systems|NAE Case Study Peru]], be used to bring standalone system companies into a market which they might otherwise be unwilling to enter by protecting them from competition (though the long-term risks of market distortion under such an arrangement should be carefully considered). Standalone systems may also be included as one means of providing electricity within an integrated electricity concession also encompassing mini-grid and/or grid system access. It’s also possible that with standalone system providers increasingly looking to pay-as-you-go arrangements, where they retain ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even over its full life with the user simply paying for electricity used, regulating electricity supply through standalone systems may become more appropriate. |
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− | Prices of standalone systems supplied by the private sector are generally unregulated. Where public funding is used to support provision of standalone systems it may (as with the Bangladesh IDCOL programme) be appropriate to regulate prices. Also, if the move towards pay-as-you-go, with users paying for electricity as they do from grid or mini-grids, while suppliers retain ownership of the capital equipment, continues or accelerates, regulation of the prices they pay may become more relevant. Regulation of prices for standalone systems, or of electricity supplied through these systems, on an individual basis is impractical given the multiplicity of systems. Uniform price regulation, where a standard price or tariff is set is more likely to be viable. However, any such regulation should recognize the differentials in costs between different types and sizes of standalone system, and parity<br/>with grid (or mini-grid) prices should only be attempted if subsidies are available to balance the cost differentials between these different Technologies.<br/> | + | Prices of standalone systems supplied by the private sector are generally unregulated. Where public funding is used to support provision of standalone systems it may (as with the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Bangladesh,_IDCOL_Solar_Home_Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]]) be appropriate to regulate prices. Also, if the move towards pay-as-you-go, with users paying for electricity as they do from grid or mini-grids, while suppliers retain ownership of the capital equipment, continues or accelerates, regulation of the prices they pay may become more relevant. Regulation of prices for standalone systems, or of electricity supplied through these systems, on an individual basis is impractical given the multiplicity of systems. Uniform price regulation, where a standard price or tariff is set is more likely to be viable. However, any such regulation should recognize the differentials in costs between different types and sizes of standalone system, and parity<br/>with grid (or mini-grid) prices should only be attempted if subsidies are available to balance the cost differentials between these different Technologies.<br/> |
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| <br/> | | <br/> |
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| == Further Informaiton and Guidance == | | == Further Informaiton and Guidance == |
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| <br/> | | <br/> |
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| + | == Relevante Case Studies: == |
| | | |
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems]]<br/> |
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/> |
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: Ethiopia, Solar Market Development|Ethiopia, Solar Market Development]]<br/> |
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]]<br/> |
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: Peru, Concession Model for Standalone Systems|Peru, Concession Model for Standalone Systems]]<br/> |
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning|Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning]]<br/> |
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: South Africa, Integrated National Electrification|South Africa, Integrated National Electrification]]<br/> |
| | | |
− | == Relevante Case Studies: ==
| + | <br/> |
| | | |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Bangladesh,_IDCOL_Solar_Home_Systems|Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems]]<br/>
| + | = References = |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Brazil,_Luz_para_Todos_(Light_for_All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/>
| + | |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Ethiopia,_Solar_Market_Development|Ethiopia, Solar Market Development]]<br/>
| + | |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Kenya,_Off-Grid_for_Vision_2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]]<br/>
| + | |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Peru,_Concession_Model_for_Standalone_Systems|Peru, Concession Model for Standalone Systems]]<br/>
| + | |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Rwanda,_Sector-Wide_Approach_to_Planning|Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning]]<br/>
| + | |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_South_Africa,_Integrated_National_Electrification|South Africa, Integrated National Electrification]]<br/>
| + | |
| | | |
| <br/> | | <br/> |
Grid-connected mini-grids and distribution systems share characteristics with both Grid Extension and Isolated Mini-grids – They are linked to the grid system and are able to import electricity from and export electricity to it, so technically they have more in common with Grid Extension. However, in that they are owned and managed independently they are more similar to Isolated Mini-grids. These differences call for different policy and regulatory approaches, so a separate Technology category has been established.