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− | National energy planning is key to establishing the economically optimum extent of the grid. Institutional restructuring, regulatory reform and policy and target setting may all be beneficial in creating the institutional and policy basis for grid extension. Capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors involved in grid extension lack capacity. Technology development/adoption and adoption of appropriate technical standards can enable grid extension at lower cost (as shown in the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Tunisia,_Low_Cost_Distribution_Technology|Tunisia NAE Case Study]] where adoption of standards allowing MALT (Mise A La Terre) distribution lowered costs), while demand promotion may be needed to increase revenues and make it economically sustainable. <br/> | + | National energy planning is key to establishing the economically optimum extent of the grid. Institutional restructuring, regulatory reform and policy and target setting may all be beneficial in creating the institutional and policy basis for grid extension. Capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors involved in grid extension lack capacity. Technology development/adoption and adoption of appropriate technical standards can enable grid extension at lower cost (as shown in the [[NAE Case Study: Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology|Tunisia NAE Case Study]] where adoption of standards allowing MALT (Mise A La Terre) distribution lowered costs), while demand promotion may be needed to increase revenues and make it economically sustainable. <br/> |
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− | Mini-grids require substantial, long-term, capital investment and hence a regulatory framework which will give developers, and particularly private financiers, confidence that there will be a market for electricity from the mini-grid for a long enough period to repay and provide an adequate return on their investment. Larger systems may require concessions (which protect against competition over a designated area and time period) to give investors the confidence in revenue forecasts to commit the long-term capital investment needed. For smaller mini-grids, with lower and shorter-term capital investment, a licensing regime (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be more appropriate, with greater flexibility and a generally less demanding process balancing lack of protection from competition for the investor, while still providing the means to protect users through price/tariff regulation and setting technical and safety standards. Mini-grids below a certain size (eg <100kW in the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Tanzania,_Mini-Grids_Regulatory_Framework|Tanzania NAE Case Study]]), are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, and the right to operate instead being granted through a general derogation from regulation. | + | Mini-grids require substantial, long-term, capital investment and hence a regulatory framework which will give developers, and particularly private financiers, confidence that there will be a market for electricity from the mini-grid for a long enough period to repay and provide an adequate return on their investment. Larger systems may require concessions (which protect against competition over a designated area and time period) to give investors the confidence in revenue forecasts to commit the long-term capital investment needed. For smaller mini-grids, with lower and shorter-term capital investment, a licensing regime (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be more appropriate, with greater flexibility and a generally less demanding process balancing lack of protection from competition for the investor, while still providing the means to protect users through price/tariff regulation and setting technical and safety standards. Mini-grids below a certain size (eg <100kW in the [[NAE Case Study: Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework|Tanzania NAE Case Study]]), are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, and the right to operate instead being granted through a general derogation from regulation. |
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| Under any regulatory regime a key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited by the terms of the concession, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. mini-grid licensees have less protection from grid extension than concessionaires, but even where there is no formal concession it is often beneficial to establish a compensation regime in the event of grid extension, to encourage private mini-grid investment in the interim. | | Under any regulatory regime a key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited by the terms of the concession, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. mini-grid licensees have less protection from grid extension than concessionaires, but even where there is no formal concession it is often beneficial to establish a compensation regime in the event of grid extension, to encourage private mini-grid investment in the interim. |
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− | Standalone systems are most frequently supplied to users through a purely private-sector chain of manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers. In a number of cases (such as shown in the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Bangladesh,_IDCOL_Solar_Home_Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]]), public-private partnership models have been used. In general this has been through use of public finance (grants, subsidies and loans) to enhance affordability and support market growth, though there could be benefits in certain circumstances for government energy agencies to become directly involved in the standalone system market, by forming a joint entity to supply systems or by taking on one of the roles along the value chain (eg providing a distribution service for all system providers). More rarely a purely public model is used to provide standalone systems to users, for example where the grid company provides standalone systems to those it is not economic to connect to the grid (eg in [[NAE_Case_Study:_South_Africa,_Integrated_National_Electrification|NAE Case Study South Africa]]). <br/> | + | Standalone systems are most frequently supplied to users through a purely private-sector chain of manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers. In a number of cases (such as shown in the [[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]]), public-private partnership models have been used. In general this has been through use of public finance (grants, subsidies and loans) to enhance affordability and support market growth, though there could be benefits in certain circumstances for government energy agencies to become directly involved in the standalone system market, by forming a joint entity to supply systems or by taking on one of the roles along the value chain (eg providing a distribution service for all system providers). More rarely a purely public model is used to provide standalone systems to users, for example where the grid company provides standalone systems to those it is not economic to connect to the grid (eg in [[NAE Case Study: South Africa, Integrated National Electrification|NAE Case Study South Africa]]). <br/> |
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− | Standalone system providers are rarely subject to regulation (beyond general business licensing requirements), though they may be required to meet certain standards in order to access subsidies and tax exemptions. In part this reflects policy-makers’ perception of them as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers, but also that without long-term fixed capital investment, private companies have not needed the protection of a concession or license to attract private capital (and would regard it simply as a regulatory burden). Concessions for standalone systems may however, as in [[NAE_Case_Study:_Peru,_Concession_Model_for_Standalone_Systems|NAE Case Study Peru]], be used to bring standalone system companies into a market which they might otherwise be unwilling to enter by protecting them from competition (though the long-term risks of market distortion under such an arrangement should be carefully considered). Standalone systems may also be included as one means of providing electricity within an integrated electricity concession also encompassing mini-grid and/or grid system access. It’s also possible that with standalone system providers increasingly looking to pay-as-you-go arrangements, where they retain ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even over its full life with the user simply paying for electricity used, regulating electricity supply through standalone systems may become more appropriate. | + | Standalone system providers are rarely subject to regulation (beyond general business licensing requirements), though they may be required to meet certain standards in order to access subsidies and tax exemptions. In part this reflects policy-makers’ perception of them as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers, but also that without long-term fixed capital investment, private companies have not needed the protection of a concession or license to attract private capital (and would regard it simply as a regulatory burden). Concessions for standalone systems may however, as in [[NAE Case Study: Peru, Concession Model for Standalone Systems|NAE Case Study Peru]], be used to bring standalone system companies into a market which they might otherwise be unwilling to enter by protecting them from competition (though the long-term risks of market distortion under such an arrangement should be carefully considered). Standalone systems may also be included as one means of providing electricity within an integrated electricity concession also encompassing mini-grid and/or grid system access. It’s also possible that with standalone system providers increasingly looking to pay-as-you-go arrangements, where they retain ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even over its full life with the user simply paying for electricity used, regulating electricity supply through standalone systems may become more appropriate. |
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− | Prices of standalone systems supplied by the private sector are generally unregulated. Where public funding is used to support provision of standalone systems it may (as with the [[NAE_Case_Study:_Bangladesh,_IDCOL_Solar_Home_Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]]) be appropriate to regulate prices. Also, if the move towards pay-as-you-go, with users paying for electricity as they do from grid or mini-grids, while suppliers retain ownership of the capital equipment, continues or accelerates, regulation of the prices they pay may become more relevant. Regulation of prices for standalone systems, or of electricity supplied through these systems, on an individual basis is impractical given the multiplicity of systems. Uniform price regulation, where a standard price or tariff is set is more likely to be viable. However, any such regulation should recognize the differentials in costs between different types and sizes of standalone system, and parity<br/>with grid (or mini-grid) prices should only be attempted if subsidies are available to balance the cost differentials between these different Technologies.<br/> | + | Prices of standalone systems supplied by the private sector are generally unregulated. Where public funding is used to support provision of standalone systems it may (as with the [[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]]) be appropriate to regulate prices. Also, if the move towards pay-as-you-go, with users paying for electricity as they do from grid or mini-grids, while suppliers retain ownership of the capital equipment, continues or accelerates, regulation of the prices they pay may become more relevant. Regulation of prices for standalone systems, or of electricity supplied through these systems, on an individual basis is impractical given the multiplicity of systems. Uniform price regulation, where a standard price or tariff is set is more likely to be viable. However, any such regulation should recognize the differentials in costs between different types and sizes of standalone system, and parity<br/>with grid (or mini-grid) prices should only be attempted if subsidies are available to balance the cost differentials between these different Technologies.<br/> |
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| = References = | | = References = |
| + | |
| + | == Authors == |
| + | |
| + | <span lang="EN-US">Authors: Mary Willcox, Dean Cooper</span> |
| + | |
| + | == Acknowledgements == |
| + | |
| + | The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations and development of the NEA categorization system used in the Review Tool. |
| + | |
| + | A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights: |
| + | |
| + | *Jeff Felten, AfDB |
| + | *Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE<br/> |
| + | *Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP<br/> |
| + | *David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF<br/> |
| + | *Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF<br/> |
| + | *Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus<br/> |
| + | *John Tkacik, REEEP<br/> |
| + | *Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy <br/> |
| + | *Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission<br/> |
| + | *Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE<br/> |
| + | *Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority<br/> |
| + | *Marion Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF |
| + | *Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF |
| + | *Rebecca Symington, Miland Foundation |
| + | *Marcel Reets, RVO NL |
| + | *Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder |
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| <br/> | | <br/> |
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| [[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] | | [[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] |
| + | <p style="text-align: center;"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Any feedback would be very welcome. If you have any comments or enquires please contact: </span>[mailto:Mary.Willcox@practicalaction.org.uk Mary.Willcox@practicalaction.org.uk]<span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">, </span>[mailto:hadley.taylor@euei-pdf.org hadley.taylor@euei-pdf.org]<span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">, or </span>[mailto:michael.koeberlein@giz.de michael.koeberlein@giz.de]<span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">.</span><br/></p> |
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| [[Category:NAE]] | | [[Category:NAE]] |
Grid-connected mini-grids and distribution systems share characteristics with both Grid Extension and Isolated Mini-grids – They are linked to the grid system and are able to import electricity from and export electricity to it, so technically they have more in common with Grid Extension. However, in that they are owned and managed independently they are more similar to Isolated Mini-grids. These differences call for different policy and regulatory approaches, so a separate Technology category has been established.
The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations and development of the NEA categorization system used in the Review Tool.
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights: