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− | <p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color:#316798ff;">'''Delivery Model: The (market) chain of organisations through which electricity is delivered to users'''</span></p> | + | <p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color:#986500ff;">'''Legal Basis: The basis on which organisations are legally entitled to sell electricity'''</span></p> |
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− | = Public Delivery Model<br/> = | + | = Concession<br/> = |
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− | | style="width: 130px; background-color: rgb(0, 156, 204);" | | + | | style="width: 130px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | |
| <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"><span style="font-size: 13.6px;">Definition:</span></span><br/> | | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"><span style="font-size: 13.6px;">Definition:</span></span><br/> |
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| | style="width: 618px;" | | | | style="width: 618px;" | |
− | '''<span></span><span>Delivery of electricity access by an entity or entities all of which are publically owned and managed, using purely public finance.</span><span></span>''' | + | '''<span></span><span></span><span>An exclusive right (monopoly) granted by government to sell electricity or standalone systems</span><span></span><span></span>''' |
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− | <span>In this delivery model all of the organisations engaged in provision of electricity access (whether through supply of electricity itself or provision of electricity systems), as part of the National Electrification Approach being considered, are state-owned. This implies that all the actors along the market chain1 (Project Development, Manufacture/Generation, Distribution and Retail) are publically owned. These may include electricity utilities, publically-owned generation, transmission and distribution companies, municipalities, or rural energy agencies. </span><span></span><br/> | + | <span>A concession may:<br/></span> |
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| + | *Cover the entire country or a specific area<br/> |
| + | *<span>Be time-limited or unlimited</span><br/> |
| + | *<span><span>Relate to one, several, or all means of electricity provision</span></span> |
| + | |
| + | <span><span><span>Concessions are usually granted to attract private investment by guaranteeing the investor protection from competition, or to protect public investment.</span><span></span></span></span> |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
| | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 102, 0);" | | | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 102, 0);" | |
| <font color="#ffffff">Technologies</font> | | <font color="#ffffff">Technologies</font> |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | | | | style="width: 616px;" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>National grid systems have most often been established under a public delivery model either through a single public electricity company owning and managing the entire system or through separate public generation, transmission and distribution companies. Grid-connected mini-grids and distribution systems may also be publically owned, for instance by a local municipality. Where isolated mini-grids or standalone systems are delivered through a public model this is generally by an electricity utility or distribution company which has adopted an integrated approach with electricity being provided using a combination of grid, mini-grid and standalone systems.<br/> | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>Grid systems and larger grid-connected mini-grids / distribution systems and isolated mini-grids almost always require concessions (because of the substantial investment required). As a result, the right to transmit and sell electricity is often reserved to the national grid company and/or mini-grid/distribution system operator (at least within the area they reach). For smaller mini-grids, with lower, shorter-term capital investment, a license (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be seen as more appropriate, and mini-grids below a certain size are often unregulated. A key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. Grid and mini-grid concessions thus often interrelate (with each preventing or having explicit provision for extending into the other’s area).<br/><br/>Concessions are more rarely used for standalone systems. This reflects policy-makers’ perception of them as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers, but also that without long-term fixed capital investment private companies have not needed the protection of a concession to attract private capital (and would regard it as a regulatory burden). Concessions may however be used to bring standalone system companies into a market which they might otherwise be unwilling to enter. It’s also possible where pay-as-you-go arrangements are used, where the provider retains ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even<br/>over its full life with the user paying for electricity used, a concession arrangement may be appropriate. Where grid or mini-grid concessions are set up, these rarely forbid sale of standalone systems by others, and vice versa, though standalone systems may be included as one means of providing electricity within an integrated electricity concession encompassing mini-grid<br/>and/or grid access.<br/> |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(154, 103, 0);" | | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(51, 103, 152);" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Legual Basis</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Delivery Models</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
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| <br/> | | <br/> |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> |
− | Regulation of public delivery models is often implicit, with oversight and control being through organisational hierarchy rather than any explicit regulatory framework. For instance a national utility company’s monopoly (concession) over generation and/or sale of electricity may be established through the legislation under which it is created rather than through any separate framework. However, though an explicit regulatory framework may not be needed to give private investors confidence, such a framework is nevertheless regarded as best practice to achieve transparency and provide a barrier to political interference.
| + | Public delivery models are frequently combined with what are effectively concessions, though the monopoly may be created by, for instance, reserving the right to sell electricity to a national utility company, and may not therefore be labelled as a concession. Oversight and control may then be through organisational hierarchy rather than any explicit regulatory framework. Concessions are used to attract private participation in private and public-private models and may be the means through which public-private models are established. |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
| | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(205, 52, 0);" | | | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(205, 52, 0);" | |
| <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Price/Tariff Regulation</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Price/Tariff Regulation</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> |
− | <span>Where electricity is delivered through public models, with no need to attract private investment, there is also a temptation to manage prices by means of the organisational hierarchy. However, without independent regulation, there is a risk that political pressure will result in prices being depressed below cost-recovery levels leading to insolvency of the electricity providers and deterioration of the electricity provision.</span><span></span> | + | <span>Where a concession is granted prices will almost certainly be regulated both to enable private investors to estimate revenues over the concession period and to protect users and ensure that the concessionaire is not over-exploiting their monopoly position. This regulation may be through the terms of the concession itself, rather than through a wider framework. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis.</span><span></span> |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
| | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(32, 56, 100);" | | | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(32, 56, 100);" | |
| <span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Finance</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Finance</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
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− | <span>By definition, a public delivery model will use public finance – by publically-owned utility companies or national or local government, potentially supported by loans and grants from international agencies - (since any private finance would cause the delivery model to be categorized as a public-private partnership). In addition public delivery models will draw on finance from users, through standalone system purchases, connection charges and ongoing charges, and for multi-user systems (grids and mini-grids) there is likely to be some element of cross-subsidy between users.</span><span></span> | + | <span>A concession is a means of attracting private finance, by offering the investor higher levels of sales (in the absence of competition) and lower risk in predicting those sales. It may also be used to protect public investment in infrastructure such as grid systems, and as a means of channelling public financial support into electricity provision.</span><span></span> |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
| | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100);" | | | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100);" | |
| <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Non-Financial Interventions</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Non-Financial Interventions</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
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− | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the delivery model employed. Institutional restructuring and capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors involved in public delivery models lack capacity is aspects of electrification. Technology development/adoption and adoption of appropriate technical standards, user awareness raising and demand promotion may be needed to increase revenues and make electricity access economically sustainable, regardless of the delivery model chosen. | + | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Institutional restructuring (eg of the national utility company) and regulatory reform may be needed to enable concessions to be established and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform or design concession arrangements. <span style="font-size: 13.6px;">Awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px;">to develop the skilled workforce needed by concessionaires can be beneficial alongside financial forms of public support.</span> |
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− | A public delivery model has the advantage of making use of existing institutions. Where these organisations have strong capabilities and are efficient, a public delivery model may allow strongly focussed and effective delivery of electrification and good coordination of grid, mini-grid and stand-alone solutions. However public organisations are often monolithic and slow moving. They may be more focussed on managing existing assets than serving new consumers, particularly in remote rural areas, and they may lack the capabilities needed to deliver new forms of electricity access. They are also vulnerable to political pressure and interference, which can hamper electrification efforts and result in poor allocation of resources. Following a private sector or private-public partnership model can allow private sector finance and skills to be brought to bear and may achieve greater flexibility, speed and efficiency.
| + | The key advantage of a concession is that, by removing the potential for others to sell within the concession area, it allows demand to be captured by a single supplier, giving them economies of scale, and makes it easier to forecast volume of sales and so easier for investors to forecast future revenues (whereas license-based price/tariff regulation only reduces price uncertainty). As well as attracting more private finance this may reduce required return on investment and hence finance costs, but it also removes the benefits of competition once the concession has been granted and so places heavier demand on regulation to protect users, though potential providers may be required to compete for the concession through a tender process. Concession approaches can be rigid, and require significant capacity within regulatory authorities to design approaches which attract private finance while avoiding over-exploitation of users. Concessions also, by their nature, create boundaries and so push investors towards project finance and thinking by limiting their ability to expand their business beyond pre-set borders or to continue it beyond the end of a concession period. For capital-intensive infrastructure-based means of electrification (grid and mini-grids), however, a concession may just represent recognition of a natural monopoly and the need for explicit arrangements for arrival of the grid, and it is for these that a concession is most likely to be appropriate. |
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− | *Barnes, D. (2007). The Challenge of Rural Electrification: Strategies for Developing Countries. Book Chapter [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iOBi17Pr3fIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0 https://][https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iOBi17Pr3fIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0 books.google.co.uk/books?id=iOBi17Pr3fIC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false]
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− | *IEA, (2010), Comparative Study on Rural Electrification Policies in Emerging Economies [https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/rural_elect.pdf https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/rural_elect.pdf]
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− | *Vietnam. The World Bank, (2011). State and People, Central and Local, Working Together: The Vietnam Rural Electrification Experience. Washington. [http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/601001468027856008/Vietnam-State-and-people-central-and-local-working-together-the-rural-electrification-experience http://][http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/601001468027856008/Vietnam-State-and-people-central-and-local-working-together-the-rural-electrification-experience documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/601001468027856008/Vietnam-State-and-people-central-and-local-working-together-the-rural-electrification-experience]
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| *[[NAE Case Study: Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/> | | *[[NAE Case Study: Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/> |
The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations. The categorization framework in the review tool is based on the EUEI/PDF / Practical Action publication "Building Energy Access Markets - A Value Chain Analysis of Key Energy Market Systems".
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights:
- Jeff Felten, AfDB - Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE - Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP - David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF - Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF - Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus - John Tkacik, REEEP - Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy - Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission - Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE - Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority - Mario Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF - Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF - Rebecca Symington, Mlinda Foundation - Marcel Raats, RVO.NL - Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder -