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| Compared to other East Asia countries, this goal was quite ambitious in the beginning. As a reference, previously South Korea only promised to tame its annual carbon emission to around 535 <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Million tonnes of CO</span><sub style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">2</sub><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"> eq by 2030, which is roughly the same level as 2005<ref>South Korea Climate Tracker, http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html</ref>. However, as neighbor nations started to speed up their commitments to climate action, Taiwan is gradually losing its leading edge on this matter. For example, South Korea has adopted a far more ambitious renewable expansion plan<ref>S. Korea unveils draft plan to foster renewable energy, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200508002200320?section=search</ref> and the green new deal<ref>South Korea to implement Green New Deal after ruling party election win, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/04/16/south-korea-implement-green-new-deal-ruling-party-election-win/</ref>; it will also achieve climate neutrality by 2050<ref>South Korea declares climate emergency, sets net zero target for 2050, https://www.eco-business.com/news/south-korea-declares-climate-emergency-sets-net-zero-target-for-2050/?sw-signup=true</ref>. In addition, many of the policy goals in Taiwan still lack integration between governmental departments<ref>加速建構轉型量能,邁向深度低碳社會 「溫室氣體減量推動方案」研擬建議, http://rsprc.ntu.edu.tw/fordownload/1061123/20171123_greenhouse_gas_rfckLReduction.pdf</ref>.</span><br/> | | Compared to other East Asia countries, this goal was quite ambitious in the beginning. As a reference, previously South Korea only promised to tame its annual carbon emission to around 535 <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Million tonnes of CO</span><sub style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">2</sub><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"> eq by 2030, which is roughly the same level as 2005<ref>South Korea Climate Tracker, http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html</ref>. However, as neighbor nations started to speed up their commitments to climate action, Taiwan is gradually losing its leading edge on this matter. For example, South Korea has adopted a far more ambitious renewable expansion plan<ref>S. Korea unveils draft plan to foster renewable energy, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200508002200320?section=search</ref> and the green new deal<ref>South Korea to implement Green New Deal after ruling party election win, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/04/16/south-korea-implement-green-new-deal-ruling-party-election-win/</ref>; it will also achieve climate neutrality by 2050<ref>South Korea declares climate emergency, sets net zero target for 2050, https://www.eco-business.com/news/south-korea-declares-climate-emergency-sets-net-zero-target-for-2050/?sw-signup=true</ref>. In addition, many of the policy goals in Taiwan still lack integration between governmental departments<ref>加速建構轉型量能,邁向深度低碳社會 「溫室氣體減量推動方案」研擬建議, http://rsprc.ntu.edu.tw/fordownload/1061123/20171123_greenhouse_gas_rfckLReduction.pdf</ref>.</span><br/> |
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− | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the 2020 emission goals might be achieved, but few environmental groups are satisfied by this short term effect and most call for a "green recovery" after the epidemic fade away<ref>綠色紓困,台灣跟上世界--環境零傷害 投資綠產業, https://www.cet-taiwan.org/info/news/3715</ref>.</span> | + | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Due to the coronavirus pandemic, the 2020 emission goals might be achieved, but few environmental groups are satisfied by this short term effect and most call for a "green recovery" after the epidemic fade away<ref>綠色紓困,台灣跟上世界--環境零傷害 投資綠產業, https://www.cet-taiwan.org/info/news/3715</ref>. Fortunately, recent discussions of net zero emission by mid century from neighboring nations provide an opportunity for more ambitious reduction goals.</span> |
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| Part of the reason why the policy remain highly consensus is because of the subtle geopolitical structure Taiwan currently has. The major opposition party, the KMT, have the most potential voters in the New Taipei City where strong anti-nuclear sentiments persist because of the 3 existing or planned <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">nuclear power plants</span> within<ref>朱立倫:2025年非核家園絕非口號, http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20150312002604-260407. The KMT mayor of New Taipei City, Chu, promised to phase out nuclear by 2025. </ref>. Meanwhile smaller progressive parties in the oppostion such as New Power Party have voters with higher environmental awareness in general, and of the 5 <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">legislators</span> New Power Party have, one also came out from New Taipei City. Similar as in Germany, there exists almost no political niche in Taiwan for any political faction to reverse the policy, though recently nuclear advocates <span style="font-size: 13.6px">do manage to launch a referendum on abolishing articles regarding nuclear phase out in the electricity act<ref>Energy Transition in Taiwan: A Rising Success or a Doomed Failure? https://medium.com/re-members/1e8f155f96be</ref></span>. However, it is still politically, legally, and in some cases technically impossible that nuclear power in Taiwan have a chance to exist after 2025. | | Part of the reason why the policy remain highly consensus is because of the subtle geopolitical structure Taiwan currently has. The major opposition party, the KMT, have the most potential voters in the New Taipei City where strong anti-nuclear sentiments persist because of the 3 existing or planned <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">nuclear power plants</span> within<ref>朱立倫:2025年非核家園絕非口號, http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20150312002604-260407. The KMT mayor of New Taipei City, Chu, promised to phase out nuclear by 2025. </ref>. Meanwhile smaller progressive parties in the oppostion such as New Power Party have voters with higher environmental awareness in general, and of the 5 <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">legislators</span> New Power Party have, one also came out from New Taipei City. Similar as in Germany, there exists almost no political niche in Taiwan for any political faction to reverse the policy, though recently nuclear advocates <span style="font-size: 13.6px">do manage to launch a referendum on abolishing articles regarding nuclear phase out in the electricity act<ref>Energy Transition in Taiwan: A Rising Success or a Doomed Failure? https://medium.com/re-members/1e8f155f96be</ref></span>. However, it is still politically, legally, and in some cases technically impossible that nuclear power in Taiwan have a chance to exist after 2025. |
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− | Like Germany, the phasing out of nuclear will be faster than the speed of renewables expansion in the early stage. This will cause a stagnate of carbon emission in electricity production before 2020, but it will also avoid the chances of having too much inflexible power plants online that would limit the power generation of variable renewables.
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| | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">NPP 1, Reactor 1</span> | | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">NPP 1, Reactor 1</span> |
| | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">December 2018</span> | | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">December 2018</span> |
− | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Decommission Ongoing</span> | + | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="font-size: 13.6px">Preparing for </span>Decommission</span> |
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| | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">NPP 1, Reactor 2</span></span><br/> | | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">NPP 1, Reactor 2</span></span><br/> |
| | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">July 2019</span> | | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">July 2019</span> |
− | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Decommission Ongoing</span> | + | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="font-size: 13.6px">Preparing for </span>Decommission</span><span style="font-size: 13.6px"></span></span> |
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| | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">NPP 2, Reactor 1</span></span><br/> | | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">NPP 2, Reactor 1</span></span><br/> |
| | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">December 2021</span> | | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">December 2021</span> |
− | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">In Service</span> | + | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Permanently Shut Down</span> |
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| | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">NPP 2, Reactor 2</span></span><br/> | | | style="text-align: center" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">NPP 2, Reactor 2</span></span><br/> |
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| ! scope="col" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Type of Renewables</span> | | ! scope="col" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Type of Renewables</span> |
| ! scope="col" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Current Capacity</span> | | ! scope="col" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Current Capacity</span> |
− | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">(as of Jul. 2020)</span><br/> | + | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">(as of Jun. 2021)</span><br/> |
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| ! scope="col" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Planned Capacity by 2025</span><br/> | | ! scope="col" | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Planned Capacity by 2025</span><br/> |
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| | style="text-align: center" | Solar | | | style="text-align: center" | Solar |
− | | style="text-align: center" | <span class="ILfuVd"><span class="e24Kjd">4.769</span></span>GW<br/> | + | | style="text-align: center" | <span class="ILfuVd"><span class="e24Kjd">6.623</span></span>GW<br/> |
| | style="text-align: center" | 20.00GW | | | style="text-align: center" | 20.00GW |
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| | style="text-align: center" | Onshore Wind | | | style="text-align: center" | Onshore Wind |
− | | style="text-align: center" | 0.724GW | + | | style="text-align: center" | 0.735GW |
| | style="text-align: center" | 1.200GW | | | style="text-align: center" | 1.200GW |
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| | style="text-align: center" | Bioenergy and Waste | | | style="text-align: center" | Bioenergy and Waste |
− | | style="text-align: center" | 0.710GW | + | | style="text-align: center" | 0.718GW |
| | style="text-align: center" | 0.813GW | | | style="text-align: center" | 0.813GW |
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− | An important indicator of whether the expansion plans will go accordingly to the plan is the achieving rates of the mid-term goal by 2020. For example, solar should reach 6.5 GW by that year. Recent government projections and plans revealed that Taiwan is on track on these mid-term goals<ref name="蘇揆拍板 擴建太陽光電"> 蘇揆拍板 擴建太陽光電, https://money.udn.com/money/story/7307/4071096</ref>. | + | An important indicator of whether the expansion plans will go accordingly to the plan is the achieving rates of the mid-term goal by 2020. For example, solar should reach 6.5 GW by that year; in the end due to the corona pandemic Taiwan fell short of almost 0.7 GW to that goal. |
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− | The government also plans to expand offshore wind capacity 1GW per year between 2026 and 2035, resulting a total capacity of 16 GW by 2035<ref name="經部規劃2026年到2035年,離岸風電10年10GW目標,預期價格將低於平均售電價格"> 經部規劃2026年到2035年,離岸風電10年10GW目標,預期價格將低於平均售電價格, https://www.moea.gov.tw/MNS/populace/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=40&news_id=87704</ref>. Besides such plan, no further renewable policy after 2025 is yet announced. | + | The government also plans to expand offshore wind capacity 1.5GW per year between 2026 and 2035, resulting a total capacity of 21 GW by 2035<ref name="經部規劃2026年到2035年,離岸風電10年10GW目標,預期價格將低於平均售電價格"> 經部規劃2026年到2035年,離岸風電10年10GW目標,預期價格將低於平均售電價格, https://www.moea.gov.tw/MNS/populace/news/News.aspx?kind=1&menu_id=40&news_id=87704</ref>. Besides such plan, no further official renewable policy after 2025 is yet announced. |
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| == Coal and Carbon Emission == | | == Coal and Carbon Emission == |
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| <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">According to the network operators in Taiwan, most [[Flexibility (Power System)|flexibility requirements]] by 2025 can be dealt without major retrofit of the system; the risk of congestion mainly lies in central Taiwan and therefore the transmission lines there will be strengthened<ref>新能源政策下之電網規劃, a document revealed by Taipower in early December 2017</ref>.</span></span></span><br/> | | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">According to the network operators in Taiwan, most [[Flexibility (Power System)|flexibility requirements]] by 2025 can be dealt without major retrofit of the system; the risk of congestion mainly lies in central Taiwan and therefore the transmission lines there will be strengthened<ref>新能源政策下之電網規劃, a document revealed by Taipower in early December 2017</ref>.</span></span></span><br/> |
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− | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Below is the power output curve a possible dispatch scheme may result to by summer 2025<ref name="Flexibility, Residual Load , & Re-dispatchment">"Flexibility, Residual Load , & Re-dispatchment", https://drive.google.com/open?id=1uJPcyUXykobIVOE-Bb58nrGyHwfbsc9X</ref>.The hard coal power plants might have to ramp more flexibly inthe future in order to adjust to the residual load variations, and this result to a reduction of coal use to around 26% in this scenario. The carbon emission intensity in this scenario was 0.396 kg CO<sub>2</sub> eq/kWh, very close to the policy goal.</span></span> | + | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Below is the power output curve a possible dispatch scheme may result to by summer 2025<ref name="Flexibility, Residual Load , & Re-dispatchment">"Flexibility, Residual Load , & Re-dispatchment", https://drive.google.com/open?id=1uJPcyUXykobIVOE-Bb58nrGyHwfbsc9X</ref>.The hard coal power plants might have to ramp more flexibly in the future in order to adjust to the residual load variations, and this result to a reduction of coal use to around 26% in this scenario. The carbon emission intensity in this scenario was 0.396 kg CO<sub>2</sub> eq/kWh, very close to the policy goal.</span></span> |
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| <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">[[File:Simulated VRE Output and Residual Load in Taiwan by summer 2025 (Policy Scenario).png|center|800px|alt=Simulated VRE Output and Residual Load in Taiwan by summer 2025.png]]</span></span> | | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">[[File:Simulated VRE Output and Residual Load in Taiwan by summer 2025 (Policy Scenario).png|center|800px|alt=Simulated VRE Output and Residual Load in Taiwan by summer 2025.png]]</span></span> |
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| <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">According to the state-owned utility Taipower's own plan, by 2028 they will be operating some 25GW of gas power plants<ref>Retirement and Installation of Large Scale Conventional Power Plants 2017-2028 ,http://www.taipower.com.tw/content/new_info/imagfckLRes/c40/c40_10605.png</ref>. This does not include the nine IPP owned by private companies, which would be about 9GW if all of them are turned to gas power plants as local governments often require recently. Although these plans are in line with the mid term transition plans to replace coal with gas in the electricity sector, in the long run electricity generation from gas in Taiwan will have to eventually decrease around 2030<ref>加速建構轉型量能,邁向深度低碳社會 「溫室氣體減量推動方案」研擬建議, http://rsprc.ntu.edu.tw/fordownload/1061123/20171123_greenhouse_gas_rfckLReduction.pdf</ref>. The risk of over-capacity beyond 2025 is putting these power plants in the risks of becoming stranded carbon assets.</span></span> | | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">According to the state-owned utility Taipower's own plan, by 2028 they will be operating some 25GW of gas power plants<ref>Retirement and Installation of Large Scale Conventional Power Plants 2017-2028 ,http://www.taipower.com.tw/content/new_info/imagfckLRes/c40/c40_10605.png</ref>. This does not include the nine IPP owned by private companies, which would be about 9GW if all of them are turned to gas power plants as local governments often require recently. Although these plans are in line with the mid term transition plans to replace coal with gas in the electricity sector, in the long run electricity generation from gas in Taiwan will have to eventually decrease around 2030<ref>加速建構轉型量能,邁向深度低碳社會 「溫室氣體減量推動方案」研擬建議, http://rsprc.ntu.edu.tw/fordownload/1061123/20171123_greenhouse_gas_rfckLReduction.pdf</ref>. The risk of over-capacity beyond 2025 is putting these power plants in the risks of becoming stranded carbon assets.</span></span> |
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| + | While gas power plants can theorotically run with green hydrogen in the long term to mitigate such risk, gas terminal and many infrastructures for the import of conventional gas are subject to more significant risk of becoming stranded assets. [[:File:Assessment of Impacts and Mitigation Approaches on Near Term Coal Reduction and Power System Dispatch of Datan Conventional Gas Terminal.pdf|The recent controversy around the construction of the Datan conventional gas terminal]] is perhaps one of the most famous example in this debate. |
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| == <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Uncertainties from Market Reformation</span></span> == | | == <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Uncertainties from Market Reformation</span></span> == |
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| <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">The electricity market reform began in 2016 and resulted in the reformation of the Electricity Law(電業法) in January 2017. The reformation of the [https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0130032 Renewable Energy Development Act](再生能源發展條例) was also completed in April 2019<ref name="renewable act">再生能源修正草案三讀通過,2025 綠電目標 27GW 入法 ,https://technews.tw/2019/04/15/renewable-energy-2025-27gw/. In the reform of the Renewable Energy Law, the goal of achieving at least 27GW of renewable energy capacity by 2025 was formally legalized.</ref>.</span></span> | | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">The electricity market reform began in 2016 and resulted in the reformation of the Electricity Law(電業法) in January 2017. The reformation of the [https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=J0130032 Renewable Energy Development Act](再生能源發展條例) was also completed in April 2019<ref name="renewable act">再生能源修正草案三讀通過,2025 綠電目標 27GW 入法 ,https://technews.tw/2019/04/15/renewable-energy-2025-27gw/. In the reform of the Renewable Energy Law, the goal of achieving at least 27GW of renewable energy capacity by 2025 was formally legalized.</ref>.</span></span> |
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− | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Current reformations of the market are just to set the proper environment for renewables to grow. The more controversial parts of the reformation were not discussed and remain uncertain to this date. For example, a main public debate is that whether or not the network utility Taipower should give up its conventional power fleet, and if so, should the new owner(s) be state-owned, municipal, or private owned<ref>電力市場自由化,Yes or No? 國營/民營是非題之外的修法方向討論 ,https://letsnews.thisistap.com/3347/. This is a thorough review of the debate during the reformation of electricity law.</ref>. </span></span> | + | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Current reformations of the market are just to set the proper environment for renewables to grow. The more controversial parts of the reformation were not discussed and remain uncertain to this date. For example, a main public debate is that whether or not the vertically integrated utility Taipower should give up its conventional power plant fleet, and if so, should the new owner(s) be state-owned, municipal, or private owned<ref>電力市場自由化,Yes or No? 國營/民營是非題之外的修法方向討論 ,https://letsnews.thisistap.com/3347/. This is a thorough review of the debate during the reformation of electricity law.</ref>. </span></span> |
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| == <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Lack of Community-Owned Projects and Individual Participation</span></span> == | | == <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Lack of Community-Owned Projects and Individual Participation</span></span> == |
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| <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Although public participation in the transition process was stressed by environmental and local groups, the legislation structure currently is still far from friendly for community or individually owned projects. For example, the electricty act still prohibits renewable energy prosumers from selling excess electricity to anyone other than the public utility, while self-consumption involving grid usage cannot sell excess electricity at all. This causes tensions between local communities and renewable project companies, who get the main economical profits of the renewable expansions.</span></span> | | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Although public participation in the transition process was stressed by environmental and local groups, the legislation structure currently is still far from friendly for community or individually owned projects. For example, the electricty act still prohibits renewable energy prosumers from selling excess electricity to anyone other than the public utility, while self-consumption involving grid usage cannot sell excess electricity at all. This causes tensions between local communities and renewable project companies, who get the main economical profits of the renewable expansions.</span></span> |
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− | == <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Lack of Long Term Goals Beyond 2025/30</span></span> == | + | == <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">Lack of Long Term Pathways / Goals Beyond 2025/30</span></span> == |
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− | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">The current legal-binding renewable expansion targets only reach 2025. After that, it is still uncertain how Taiwan will evolve to a deeply-decarbonized society by 2050. Currently the "Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act"(溫室氣體減量及管理法) is undergoing amendment so that the goals can be more effectively achieved (especially on the topic of carbon tax)<ref>《溫管法》修法牛步遭批 環保署擬制定碳費、增氣候調適專章 ,https://e-info.org.tw/node/223955</ref>.</span></span> | + | <span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)"><span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">The current legal-binding renewable expansion targets only reach 2025. After that, it is still uncertain how Taiwan will evolve to a deeply-decarbonized society by 2050. Currently the "Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act"(溫室氣體減量及管理法) is undergoing amendment so that the goals can be more effectively achieved (especially on the topic of carbon tax)<ref>《溫管法》修法牛步遭批 環保署擬制定碳費、增氣候調適專章 ,https://e-info.org.tw/node/223955</ref>. Net zero emission pathways and goals are now also on the table for discussion.<ref>https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/12/14/taiwan-models-net-zero-scenarios-campaigners-push-2050-target/</ref></span></span> |
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| [[Category:Taiwan]] | | [[Category:Taiwan]] |
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Taiwan is ongoing its energy transition. The transition will highlight a rapid growth of renewable electricity capacity and generation, but many other sectors such as transportation, building, and manufacture sectors will also be involved. The goal of this transition process is to ultimately meet Taiwan's own Intended National Determined Contribution published in 2015[1] and "Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act"(溫室氣體減量及管理法)[2], which stated that compared to 2005, annual carbon emission should be reduced by 20% by 2030 and 50% by 2050. This is a reduction of about 53 Million tonnes of CO2 eq by 2030 and 133 Million tonnes by 2050.
Compared to other East Asia countries, this goal was quite ambitious in the beginning. As a reference, previously South Korea only promised to tame its annual carbon emission to around 535 Million tonnes of CO2 eq by 2030, which is roughly the same level as 2005[3]. However, as neighbor nations started to speed up their commitments to climate action, Taiwan is gradually losing its leading edge on this matter. For example, South Korea has adopted a far more ambitious renewable expansion plan[4] and the green new deal[5]; it will also achieve climate neutrality by 2050[6]. In addition, many of the policy goals in Taiwan still lack integration between governmental departments[7].
As a neighbor of Japan and also located on the ring of fire, the public opposition of nuclear power in Taiwan grew significant after the Fukushima incident in 2011. The rally for a nuclear phaseout plan attracted some 200,000 people to go to the streets in 2013[10]. Therefore by 2015, all major political parties that participated the president election in the following year promised to phase-out all existing nuclear power plants during their campaign[11].
Nuclear phaseout remains a consensus among the major parties in the parliament after 2016. even when some nuclear proponents continue to link the issues of grid management failures and industrial air pollution to the lack of nuclear power throughout the years, their efforts remained limited.
Part of the reason why the policy remain highly consensus is because of the subtle geopolitical structure Taiwan currently has. The major opposition party, the KMT, have the most potential voters in the New Taipei City where strong anti-nuclear sentiments persist because of the 3 existing or planned nuclear power plants within[12]. Meanwhile smaller progressive parties in the oppostion such as New Power Party have voters with higher environmental awareness in general, and of the 5 legislators New Power Party have, one also came out from New Taipei City. Similar as in Germany, there exists almost no political niche in Taiwan for any political faction to reverse the policy, though recently nuclear advocates do manage to launch a referendum on abolishing articles regarding nuclear phase out in the electricity act[13]. However, it is still politically, legally, and in some cases technically impossible that nuclear power in Taiwan have a chance to exist after 2025.
The following sources of renewable energy are planned to increase capacity significantly by 2025: solar, offshore wind, biogas, onshore wind, and geothermal. Below is a chart of the current status[14] and goals of expansion[15]:
An important indicator of whether the expansion plans will go accordingly to the plan is the achieving rates of the mid-term goal by 2020. For example, solar should reach 6.5 GW by that year; in the end due to the corona pandemic Taiwan fell short of almost 0.7 GW to that goal.
The government also plans to expand offshore wind capacity 1.5GW per year between 2026 and 2035, resulting a total capacity of 21 GW by 2035[16]. Besides such plan, no further official renewable policy after 2025 is yet announced.
In the mid term, the goal of renewable sources in electricity generation share is 20% by 2025. Meanwhile, coal use is to be reduced to 30%, compared to 45% in 2016. The carbon emission intensity of electricity generation is to be reduced from 0.529 kg CO2 eq/kWh in 2016 to 0.394 kg CO2 eq/kWh by 2025[18]. The carbon emission intensity of electricity generation in Taiwan in 2019 was 0.509 kg CO2 eq/kWh.[20]
To reduce coal use, many existing coal power plants will be turned to gas power plants, and hard coal power plants are expected to operate more flexibly in the future.
According to the International Energy Agency, up until now there exist four phases of integrating variable renewables onto the grid[21]. With about 1% of electricity generated by solar and wind, Taiwan had been in the first phase in the last years, when grid integration was still not a major problem for renewable energy sources. Even as Taiwan starts to enter phase two recently, the effects of variable renewables are still relatively minor. For example, the solar eclipse on 21 June 2020 saw some of the greatest ramping rates of solar in the power system so far, yet this did not cause any significant impact on the grid.
While gas power plants can theorotically run with green hydrogen in the long term to mitigate such risk, gas terminal and many infrastructures for the import of conventional gas are subject to more significant risk of becoming stranded assets. The recent controversy around the construction of the Datan conventional gas terminal is perhaps one of the most famous example in this debate.