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| [[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] | | [[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] |
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− | <p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color:#316798ff;">'''Delivery Model: The (market) chain of organisations through which electricity is delivered to users'''</span></p> | + | <p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color:#cb3300ff;">'''Price/Tariff Regulation: The basis on which the price of electricity (or of standalone systems) are regulated'''</span></p> |
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− | = Public Delivery Model<br/> = | + | = Uniform Price/Tariff:<br/> = |
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− | '''<span></span><span>Delivery of electricity access by an entity or entities all of which are publically owned and managed, using purely public finance.</span><span></span>''' | + | '''<span></span><span></span><span>A regime under which all providers within a given category are required to sell electricity (or standalone systems) at the same price or tariff (or set of prices/tariffs). </span><span></span><span></span>''' |
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− | <span>In this delivery model all of the organisations engaged in provision of electricity access (whether through supply of electricity itself or provision of electricity systems), as part of the National Electrification Approach being considered, are state-owned. This implies that all the actors along the market chain1 (Project Development, Manufacture/Generation, Distribution and Retail) are publically owned. These may include electricity utilities, publically-owned generation, transmission and distribution companies, municipalities, or rural energy agencies. </span><span></span><br/> | + | <span>A uniform price/tariff arrangement may:<br/></span> |
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| + | *Address purchase costs for standalone systems or connection charges and charges for electricity used or flat monthly changes<br/> |
| + | *<span>Encompass a set of prices/tariffs for different classes of user (eg household, commercial and industrial) or for different levels of provision (eg size of solar home system) </span><br/> |
| + | *<span><span>Relate to one, several, or all technologies. Thus it may cover just electricity from solar home systems, or just from wind-powered mini-grids, or require that isolated mini-grids supply electricity at the same prices as the grid (a grid-parity price/tariff)</span></span><br/> |
| + | *<span><span><span>Be based on an assessment of the average cost of provision, on existing grid prices, or on estimates of the avoided cost of grid extension. </span><span></span></span></span> |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>National grid systems have most often been established under a public delivery model either through a single public electricity company owning and managing the entire system or through separate public generation, transmission and distribution companies. Grid-connected mini-grids and distribution systems may also be publically owned, for instance by a local municipality. Where isolated mini-grids or standalone systems are delivered through a public model this is generally by an electricity utility or distribution company which has adopted an integrated approach with electricity being provided using a combination of grid, mini-grid and standalone systems.<br/> | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>It is usual for grid systems to use a uniform price/tariff structure, relying on the cross-subsidies inherent in a single unitary system with a single owner to balance differences in cost of provision in different areas. However, even in a grid context a uniform price/tariff structure can dis-incentivize the electricity provider from extending access to more remote, low demand areas, where the cost of provision is higher and they may be unable to recover costs or will have to raise prices for all customers.<br/><br/>If a uniform tariff is imposed on grid-connected mini-grids, distribution systems or isolated mini-grids, which are separately owned, it will be necessary to establish a system of subsidies or cross-subsidies between providers. Without this, providers in areas where costs are lower may make excess profits while in areas where costs are higher providers become insolvent<br/>or users remain unserved. For this reason individual price/tariff regulation is often applied to larger mini-grids, though for small mini-grids the costs may out-balance the benefits of individual price/tariff regulation, and a uniform tariff may be applied.<br/> |
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− | |-
| + | For standalone systems, prices are frequently unregulated. If prices are regulated, it’s more likely to be on a uniform than an individual basis, since standalone system businesses are not usually tied to a location and so differences in costs are likely to be linked to their technology offer, efficiency of operation, or financing structure rather than any fundamental factors outside the businesses control. (Within any uniform price regulation of standalone systems it will be necessary to consider how to incentivize system providers to move into more remote areas where distribution costs are higher). |
− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/>
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(154, 103, 0);" |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Legual Basis</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/>
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− | <br/>
| + | The issues inherent in a uniform price/tariff regulatory structure will be all the greater if it is extended across more than one technology, for instance if isolated mini-grids or standalone systems are expected to supply electricity at the same prices as the grid system. |
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− | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | + | |- |
− | Regulation of public delivery models is often implicit, with oversight and control being through organisational hierarchy rather than any explicit regulatory framework. For instance a national utility company’s monopoly (concession) over generation and/or sale of electricity may be established through the legislation under which it is created rather than through any separate framework. However, though an explicit regulatory framework may not be needed to give private investors confidence, such a framework is nevertheless regarded as best practice to achieve transparency and provide a barrier to political interference.
| + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <br/> |
| + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(154, 103, 0);" | Delivery Models |
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| + | A uniform regulated price/tariff structure is consistent with a public delivery model, with cross-subsidy between publically-owned entities and subsidy from wider public resources being relatively straightforward. Combining uniform prices/tariffs with a private delivery model is problematic, since this model precludes public financial support, leaving cross-subsidies between providers as the only option for balancing differences in costs. The need for subsidy to support a uniform price/tariff structure is thus likely to result in a public-private partnership model rather than pure private sector delivery. |
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| | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(0, 152, 203);" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(205, 52, 0);" | | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(154, 103, 0);" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Price/Tariff Regulation</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Legual Basis</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> |
− | <span>Where electricity is delivered through public models, with no need to attract private investment, there is also a temptation to manage prices by means of the organisational hierarchy. However, without independent regulation, there is a risk that political pressure will result in prices being depressed below cost-recovery levels leading to insolvency of the electricity providers and deterioration of the electricity provision.</span><span></span>
| + | Uniform prices or tariffs may be established through either concessions or a licensing system. In principle uniform prices/tariffs may be set through general legislation without licensing electricity providers. Enforcement will then rely on prosecution of any providers who exceed set prices or tariffs. |
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| | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> | | | style="width: 616px;" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span> |
− | <span>By definition, a public delivery model will use public finance – by publically-owned utility companies or national or local government, potentially supported by loans and grants from international agencies - (since any private finance would cause the delivery model to be categorized as a public-private partnership). In addition public delivery models will draw on finance from users, through standalone system purchases, connection charges and ongoing charges, and for multi-user systems (grids and mini-grids) there is likely to be some element of cross-subsidy between users.</span><span></span> | + | <span>A uniform price/tariff regime will give private financiers clarity. Whether this attracts finance will depend critically on whether the prices or tariffs set enable them to make adequate return on investment. Given variations in costs of provision it is likely to attract investment into easier to access areas and lower cost electricity technologies, and potentially enable businesses providing these to make high profits, while excluding from electricity access those living in smaller communities in more remote areas. In addition private financiers may see uniform prices/tariffs as arbitrary, inflexible and non-cost reflective, thus presenting a risk to future revenues and so discourage investment. Grants and subsidies may, of course, be used to attract private finance in the context of a uniform price or tariff system, as may tax exemptions or guarantees. However if they, too, are set on a uniform basis, while they may extend the group of users to whom electricity can be economically provided, they are also likely to create additional excess profits for those elements of electricity provision which could anyway have been delivered economically, while leaving others outside this envelope. If grants or subsidies are structured to reflect costs of provision, they may counterbalance the rigidity of uniform prices/tariffs, by transferring cost –reflectivity from tariffs to grants/subsidies. Cross-subsidies are also used to transfer income from those providers who face lower delivery cost to those with higher costs. Establishment of uniform prices or tariffs will obviously directly affect finance derived from users through these charges and the need for users to be able to access finance, or pay-as-you-go arrangement to cover any up-front element of these costs.</span><span></span> |
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− | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the delivery model employed. Institutional restructuring and capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors involved in public delivery models lack capacity is aspects of electrification. Technology development/adoption and adoption of appropriate technical standards, user awareness raising and demand promotion may be needed to increase revenues and make electricity access economically sustainable, regardless of the delivery model chosen.
| + | Establishing (or amending or removing) a uniform price/tariff regime will require regulatory reform and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this reform. Direct provision by implementing authorities is an alternative route to achieving uniform prices/tariffs. Other non-financial interventions, such as policy and target setting, establishment of quality and technical standards, awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users <span style="font-size: 13.6px;">and service providers, provision of market information and training (capacity building) for businesses and workers, may be </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px;">beneficial but are not specifically related to a uniform price/tariff structure. National energy planning will be key to establishing </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px;">the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the form of price/tariff </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px;">regulation employed.</span> |
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| = Unregulated = | | = Unregulated = |
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− | For more information on this topic please see the [[National Approaches to Electrification – Legal Basis#Unregulated|'Unregulated' Sub-Section on the Legal Basis Page]]. | + | For more information on this topic please see the [[National Approaches to Electrification – Legal Basis#Unregulated|'Unregulated' Sub-Section on the Legal Basis Page]].<br/> |
− | <br/> | + | |
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| = References = | | = References = |
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Technology
|
It is usual for grid systems to use a uniform price/tariff structure, relying on the cross-subsidies inherent in a single unitary system with a single owner to balance differences in cost of provision in different areas. However, even in a grid context a uniform price/tariff structure can dis-incentivize the electricity provider from extending access to more remote, low demand areas, where the cost of provision is higher and they may be unable to recover costs or will have to raise prices for all customers.
If a uniform tariff is imposed on grid-connected mini-grids, distribution systems or isolated mini-grids, which are separately owned, it will be necessary to establish a system of subsidies or cross-subsidies between providers. Without this, providers in areas where costs are lower may make excess profits while in areas where costs are higher providers become insolvent or users remain unserved. For this reason individual price/tariff regulation is often applied to larger mini-grids, though for small mini-grids the costs may out-balance the benefits of individual price/tariff regulation, and a uniform tariff may be applied.
For standalone systems, prices are frequently unregulated. If prices are regulated, it’s more likely to be on a uniform than an individual basis, since standalone system businesses are not usually tied to a location and so differences in costs are likely to be linked to their technology offer, efficiency of operation, or financing structure rather than any fundamental factors outside the businesses control. (Within any uniform price regulation of standalone systems it will be necessary to consider how to incentivize system providers to move into more remote areas where distribution costs are higher).
The issues inherent in a uniform price/tariff regulatory structure will be all the greater if it is extended across more than one technology, for instance if isolated mini-grids or standalone systems are expected to supply electricity at the same prices as the grid system.
|
|
Delivery Models
|
A uniform regulated price/tariff structure is consistent with a public delivery model, with cross-subsidy between publically-owned entities and subsidy from wider public resources being relatively straightforward. Combining uniform prices/tariffs with a private delivery model is problematic, since this model precludes public financial support, leaving cross-subsidies between providers as the only option for balancing differences in costs. The need for subsidy to support a uniform price/tariff structure is thus likely to result in a public-private partnership model rather than pure private sector delivery.
|
|
Legual Basis
|
Uniform prices or tariffs may be established through either concessions or a licensing system. In principle uniform prices/tariffs may be set through general legislation without licensing electricity providers. Enforcement will then rely on prosecution of any providers who exceed set prices or tariffs.
|
|
Finance
|
A uniform price/tariff regime will give private financiers clarity. Whether this attracts finance will depend critically on whether the prices or tariffs set enable them to make adequate return on investment. Given variations in costs of provision it is likely to attract investment into easier to access areas and lower cost electricity technologies, and potentially enable businesses providing these to make high profits, while excluding from electricity access those living in smaller communities in more remote areas. In addition private financiers may see uniform prices/tariffs as arbitrary, inflexible and non-cost reflective, thus presenting a risk to future revenues and so discourage investment. Grants and subsidies may, of course, be used to attract private finance in the context of a uniform price or tariff system, as may tax exemptions or guarantees. However if they, too, are set on a uniform basis, while they may extend the group of users to whom electricity can be economically provided, they are also likely to create additional excess profits for those elements of electricity provision which could anyway have been delivered economically, while leaving others outside this envelope. If grants or subsidies are structured to reflect costs of provision, they may counterbalance the rigidity of uniform prices/tariffs, by transferring cost –reflectivity from tariffs to grants/subsidies. Cross-subsidies are also used to transfer income from those providers who face lower delivery cost to those with higher costs. Establishment of uniform prices or tariffs will obviously directly affect finance derived from users through these charges and the need for users to be able to access finance, or pay-as-you-go arrangement to cover any up-front element of these costs.
|
|
Non-Financial Interventions
|
Establishing (or amending or removing) a uniform price/tariff regime will require regulatory reform and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this reform. Direct provision by implementing authorities is an alternative route to achieving uniform prices/tariffs. Other non-financial interventions, such as policy and target setting, establishment of quality and technical standards, awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, provision of market information and training (capacity building) for businesses and workers, may be beneficial but are not specifically related to a uniform price/tariff structure. National energy planning will be key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the form of price/tariff regulation employed.
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The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations. The categorization framework in the review tool is based on the EUEI/PDF / Practical Action publication "Building Energy Access Markets - A Value Chain Analysis of Key Energy Market Systems".
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights:
- Jeff Felten, AfDB - Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE - Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP - David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF - Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF - Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus - John Tkacik, REEEP - Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy - Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission - Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE - Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority - Mario Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF - Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF - Rebecca Symington, Mlinda Foundation - Marcel Raats, RVO.NL - Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder -