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− | '''<span></span><span></span><span></span><span>Finance provided by investors or lenders in the expectation of financial returns (profit). </span><span></span><span></span><span></span>''' | + | '''<span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span>Reform of laws and regulations governing the generation, distribution and sale of electricity, and of related processes and procedures.</span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span>''' |
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− | <span>Private finance will be input on commercial terms, meaning that the investor or lender will expect to receive returns that exceed the original investment or loan and at a level that reflects the risks involved. Factors considered by financiers may include risks to implementation, delivery and technology performance, risks of cost escalation, market/demand and credit/payment risks, regulatory and macro-economic risks and external risks such as policy framework and weather. Any financier will require clear information on forecast revenues and potential risks before providing funding. It may be difficult for new electricity businesses working in new markets, and for users without a formal credit-record, to give commercial funders the confidence they require. Finance for electrification may come in the form of equity investment, or capital asset or working capital loans, and may be provided to a business as a whole, to a specific project or to end-users.<span><span><span></span><span></span></span></span></span> | + | <span>Because electricity is such an essential service, most countries have some regulation of who may provide and sell electricity, and on what terms, to protect both providers and users. Often these have in the past been based on the assumption that electricity will be provided through a national grid system. As new options for electricity provision emerge, regulatory reform may be needed to enable their implementation, to create incentives for private and public sector power utilities to provide electricity, both through the extension of electricity networks and decentralized power provision, and to protect users.</span><br/> |
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− | '''''Equity''''' - Any equity investment implies partial business ownership, with the investor taking the risk of losing their investment if the electricity venture fails, but also expecting to receive bonus returns if forecast targets are exceeded. Early stage investment in new businesses often relies on finance from entrepreneurial individuals, angel investors or venture capitalists who are willing to take large risks but expect to receive high returns on their investment if it’s successful.<br/><br/>'''''Loans''''' - capital asset loans are used, generally in later stages of business development and on specific projects, to leverage equity investment enabling businesses to scale up and expand their assets. Capital lenders expect repayment of loans over fixed periods and with pre-agreed (fixed or variable) interest rates, so that if profits fall short of forecasts payments are reduced only once equity capital has been exhausted, but if forecasts are exceeded lenders receive no additional benefit.<br/><br/>'''''Working capital'''''- alongside capital investment, most businesses require working capital to bridge the gap between expenditure and receipt of revenues. Working capital is particularly needed by, for instance, solar product businesses, where there may be three months or more between purchase/ import of the product by the business and sale to the end-user.<br/>
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− | '''''Sources of finance''''' - Often both international and local finance is required to support electrification – particularly where capital equipment or products are imported. The scale of funding needed for electrification may require international finance, and international financiers may have greater familiarity with, and hence be more comfortable with, some of the issues associated with the energy sector, particularly if their funding is channelled through an international company. However, local private funders will be more familiar with the national context and be more confident in resolving, and hence charge less premium for, risks associated with it. Exchange rate, and hence macro-economic, risks will always be an issue for private financiers where any of the electrification costs are in foreign currency. This issue will be greater where international funding is used to cover more than just import costs, and international funders will be very reluctant to provide finance if repatriation of funds is constrained. <br/>
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>Most national grid systems are constructed using public funds, though private finance can be introduced through privatisation of existing assets, inviting private generators to feed into the national grid, or establishment of distribution/grid-connected mini-grid concessions. For instance, the introduction of feed-in tariffs (e.g. in Tanzania) has provided the basis for private investment in generation. Mini-grids are more frequently, though by no means always, financed by the private sector since the smaller investment and shorter payback period can reduce the risks and provides a more manageable business opportunity. Stand-alone systems offer even greater opportunities for market-based finance since the relatively short period between purchase and sale to the user means that that only business establishment and a small amount of equipment capital investment is at risk. | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span>Regulation of the grid system is generally well established. Reform may be required in order to allow for privatisation and introduction of private finance, creation of grid connected distribution systems or introduction of grid connected mini-grids or Independent Power Plants. Regulatory reform may also be needed to allow and incentivize isolated mini-grids. Standalone systems have in the past generally been unregulated, but as these become a more significant element in electricity provision, reform may be undertaken to bring them under regulatory control and to create incentives for their supply. In particular it may be necessary in order to allow pay-as-you-go arrangements to be established. |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Delivery Models</span><br/> | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Delivery Model</span><br/> |
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− | Application of market-based finance, by definition, requires private sector ownership or a public-private partnership (PPP). PPPs are often an effective way to attract private finance since the public-sector element can offer funding and offset the risk associated with financing of electrification. Any private or PPP financing will require a business model with clear investment requirements and projections of income that provide expected return on investment over an acceptable timeframe, and with acceptable levels of risk and uncertainty.
| + | Within a public delivery model, regulatory reform will generally be a matter of improving efficiency and transparency. Reform is likely, however, be fundamental to allowing private and public-private partnership models for electricity delivery. The regulatory structure which is the outcome of this reform will form the basis of the development of these models and how they deliver electricity access. |
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− | Any private finance provider will consider the legal basis of electrification in terms of the risk profile it presents to them. The lower the risk and the greater certainty, the more likelihood that private finance will be available and at a lower cost. The most fundamental requirement for any private investment in fixed assets is clarity around the legality of operating and selling electricity. This may be provided explicitly through a concession or license, or through a general exclusion of certain types of electricity provision (e.g. mini-grids below a certain size) from the need to be licensed. Without this basic regulatory clarity, and so with the risk that future introduction of regulation may undermine their business and restrict their levels of income, it will be extremely difficult to attract private finance for electrification.
| + | The current regulatory framework must be the stating point for any reform. In many cases this will be a monopoly (nation-wide concession) for the national utility. The fundamental requirement to allow private sector participation is to make it legal. This may achieved simply by change in the law allowing all to generate and sell electricity, but authorities generally wish to maintain some level of oversight, over larger mini-grids at least, and so require their operators to be licensed. Alternatively, concession areas may be established, creating local monopolies for which electricity businesses can compete, with the terms of the concession agreement setting out the concessionaires rights and obligations. Standalone system providers are not usually covered by any utility monopoly (since it is the means of accessing electricity rather than electricity itself which they are selling), but as they become a more significant element in electricity provision, and particularly to allow pay-as-you-go arrangements, their regulation may be appropriate. Regulatory reform will be required to introduce such regulatory approaches, or to transition between one approach and another according to experience under local conditions.<br/> |
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− | Is a critical factor for private investment in electrification, with inadequate or inappropriate price/tariff regulation often cited as the key barrier to such finance. Whatever form of price/tariff regulation is used the critical requirement is that it is clear and transparent, as without this, private financiers will see a significant risk of political pressure reducing prices or tariffs to the point below which they fail to cover investment costs.
| + | Regulatory reform is also central to establishing regulation of prices and tariffs. Appropriate price/tariff regulation is important to to protect users and incentivize suppliers. To see further information on different forms of price/tariff regulation, please go to the Uniform Price/Tariff and Individual Price/Tariff category descriptions.<br/> |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Other Forms of Finance</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Finance</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
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− | <span style="font-size: 13.6px;">In many cases some other form(s) of public finance such as grants, subsidies, concessionary loans, tax exemptions or guarantees (to reduce investment risks) will be needed alongside private finance to overcome the lack of user spending power and the high costs of early market development.</span><span></span> | + | <span style="font-size: 13.6px;">The most usual motives for regulatory reform are to allow and encourage private, commercial, investment in electricity provision and to protect users and limit the requirement for user finance through price/tariff regulation. Reform to financial and tax regulation may also be needed to allow pay-as-you-go arrangements and to establish any tax exemptions. While grants, subsidies and guarantees are less directly linked to regulatory reform, it is important that they be aligned with the regulatory framework established.</span> |
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− | '''''User Finance''''' – Charges paid by users provide the means to repay electricity providers’ loans and equity investments and pay interest and return on capital. Where upfront charges are imposed on users, they may in turn seek to borrow to cover these charges and then repay the loan over time. Alternatively the electricity provider may seek additional finance in order to reduce up-front charges and so minimize barriers to users accessing their services.
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Non-Financial Interventions</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;">Other Forms of Non-Financial Interventions</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF;"></span><br/> |
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− | Most support activities to assist national electrification will reduce the perceived financial risk and so help to attract private sector investment and sustainable market development. Providing policies and targets, standards and technical assistance for new electrification initiatives will all increase the private financier’s certainty regarding the likely outcomes and so reduce the risk of investment. Market information, capacity building and customer engagement through promotional activity will all have a similar positive effect.<span style="font-size: 13.6px;"></span>
| + | Institutional Restructuring frequently accompanies Regulatory Reform, particularly where<br/>restructuring is needed to manage the regulatory framework being established. Both the regulatory framework and the institutional structure should be aligned with government policy and targets. Capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors involved do not have the expertise needed to design the regulatory framework. <span style="font-size: 13.6px;"></span> |
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− | If private finance is attracted, it can support rapid electrification at a large scale, and can free up public funding to be used for other things. If market conditions are such as to attract purely private finance, this indicates that the electrification process will be self-sustaining without dependence upon external grants or subsidies from the government or donor organisations. Where customers are able to pay for electricity at a level that allows the supply to be maintained under market conditions, there is no concern over the withdrawal of public funding that may then prevent continued access to electricity. Experience also indicates that involvement of private finance can drive innovation and efficiencies in electrification as in other sectors.
| + | <span style="font-size: 13.6px;">Regulatory reform is an essential pre-requisite to many National Electrification Approaches. Its main disadvantages are the costs and resources used in reform, and the risk that the regulatory system designed may not, in practice, support the intended objectives and that over-regulation may hamper rather than assist improvements in electricity access.</span><br/> |
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− | Private finance, however, requires clear evidence that revenues will provide returns on investment, and this may be an insurmountable barrier, particularly for forms of electrification such as grid and mini-grid systems which have high upfront capital costs that will be recovered over long periods (perhaps 20 years). Even where macro-economic conditions are stable, regulatory frameworks and prices/tariffs transparent, and users able to afford electricity, financiers may be reluctant to provide support in the absence of established companies with a track record of performance. Much time and effort may be expended in the attempt to attract sufficient private finance without the required results. Furthermore, private finance is usually more expensive than general government borrowing and this will particularly be the case for programmes that are seen by the financiers as carrying significant levels of risk.
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Interventions should be regarded as part of a National Electrification Approache only if they are integral to governement electrification policy/strategy
The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations. The categorization framework in the review tool is based on the EUEI/PDF / Practical Action publication "Building Energy Access Markets - A Value Chain Analysis of Key Energy Market Systems".
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights:
- Jeff Felten, AfDB - Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE - Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP - David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF - Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF - Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus - John Tkacik, REEEP - Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy - Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission - Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE - Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority - Mario Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF - Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF - Rebecca Symington, Mlinda Foundation - Marcel Raats, RVO.NL - Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder -