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− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Costa_Rica,_Distribution_Cooperatives|Costa Rica, Distribution Cooperatives]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Costa Rica, Distribution Cooperatives|Costa Rica, Distribution Cooperatives]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Nepal,_Rural_Energy_Development_Programme|Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme|Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_South_Africa,_Integrated_National_Electrification|South Africa, Integrated National Electrification]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: South Africa, Integrated National Electrification|South Africa, Integrated National Electrification]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Tunisia,_Low_Cost_Distribution_Technology|Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology|Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology]]<br/> |
| *[[NAE Case Study: Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion|Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion]]<br/> | | *[[NAE Case Study: Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion|Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion]]<br/> |
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− | If private finance is attracted, it can support rapid electrification at a large scale, and can free up public funding to be used for other things. If market conditions are such as to attract purely private finance, this indicates that the electrification process will be self-sustaining without dependence upon external grants or subsidies from the government or donor organisations. Where customers are able to pay for electricity at a level that allows the supply to be maintained under market conditions, there is no concern over the withdrawal of public funding that may then prevent continued access to electricity. Experience also indicates that involvement of private finance can drive innovation and efficiencies in electrification as in other sectors.
| + | The main benefit from institutional reform is to improve the operation and therefore the efficiency of current organisations involved with the expansion of electrification and to align them with new models and approaches to electrification. The electricity industry has usually been centred upon a national power utility, whose focus has been exclusively on grid-extension. With the increasing cost of electrification to remote areas, alternatives to the central grid have become more relevant, but the utility is often not structured in a way that can consider and react to these alternatives. The reform of the utility, and related state structures, can increase the ability of the sector to consider and react more positively to new electrification approaches. |
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− | Private finance, however, requires clear evidence that revenues will provide returns on investment, and this may be an insurmountable barrier, particularly for forms of electrification such as grid and mini-grid systems which have high upfront capital costs that will be recovered over long periods (perhaps 20 years). Even where macro-economic conditions are stable, regulatory frameworks and prices/tariffs transparent, and users able to afford electricity, financiers may be reluctant to provide support in the absence of established companies with a track record of performance. Much time and effort may be expended in the attempt to attract sufficient private finance without the required results. Furthermore, private finance is usually more expensive than general government borrowing and this will particularly be the case for programmes that are seen by the financiers as carrying significant levels of risk.
| + | An immediate disadvantage from such reform is the impact of change. Such change is often disruptive and will initially require additional resources to introduce unfamiliar systems and there may be significant costs associated with new infrastructure and systems. There will also be the need to support capacity building for operators who have been involved with previous systems, and possibly the introduction of new staff to enable sustainable reform processes. Given these costs it is important to be sure that institutional restructuring is necessary and not just a distraction from the real challenges of extending electrification. However it is usually a one-off, upfront cost to put changes into effect; this can then be compensated over time from the improved efficiencies and more cost-effective output. |
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− | | | + | | <div>-IADB (Balza, Jimenez, Mercado), Dec 2013, Privatization, Institutional Reform, and Performance in the Latin American Electricity Sector. [https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/6016 https://][https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/6016 publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/6016]</div><div>-The World Bank Group, (2012). Institutional Approaches to Electrification: The Experience of Rural Energy Agencies/ Rural Energy Funds in Sub-Saharan Africa. November 14–16, 2011 Dakar, Senegal [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26073/763820WP0P11090s0to0Electrification.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y https][https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26073/763820WP0P11090s0to0Electrification.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y ://][https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26073/763820WP0P11090s0to0Electrification.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26073/763820WP0P11090s0to0Electrification.][https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26073/763820WP0P11090s0to0Electrification.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y pdf?sequence][https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26073/763820WP0P11090s0to0Electrification.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y =1&isAllowed=y]</div> |
− | *De Montfort University (2013), Financing Energy Access and Off-grid Electrification: A Review of Status, Options and Challenges [https://www.dmu.ac.uk/documents/technology-documents/research-faculties/oasys/project-outputs/peer-reviewed-journal-articles/pj7--financing-energy-access--rser-paper.pdf https://www.dmu.ac.uk/documents/technology-documents/research-faculties/oasys/project-outputs/peer-reviewed-journal-articles/pj7--financing-energy-access--rser-paper.pdf]
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− | *UNEP-FI (2012), Financing renewable energy in developing countries [http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Financing_Renewable_Energy_in_subSaharan_Africa.pdf http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Financing_Renewable_Energy_in_subSaharan_Africa.pdf]
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− | *[[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems]]<br/>
| + | *[[NAE Case Study: Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation|Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation]] |
− | *[[NAE Case Study: Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/>
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− | *[[NAE Case Study: Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation|Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation]]<br/> | + | |
− | *[[NAE Case Study: Ethiopia, Solar Market Development|Ethiopia, Solar Market Development]]<br/>
| + | |
| *[[NAE Case Study: Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]]<br/> | | *[[NAE Case Study: Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]]<br/> |
| *[[NAE Case Study: Mali, Rural Electrification Programme|Mali, Rural Electrification Programme]]<br/> | | *[[NAE Case Study: Mali, Rural Electrification Programme|Mali, Rural Electrification Programme]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE Case Study: Philippines, Islanded Distribution by Cooperatives|Philippines, Islanded Distribution by Cooperatives]]<br/> | + | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Peru,_Concession_Model_for_Standalone_Systems|Peru, Concession Model for Standalone Systems]]<br/> |
− | *[[NAE Case Study: Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning|Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning]]<br/>
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| *[[NAE Case Study: Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework|Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework]]<br/> | | *[[NAE Case Study: Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework|Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework]]<br/> |
| *[[NAE Case Study: Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion|Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion]]<br/> | | *[[NAE Case Study: Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion|Vietnam, Rapid Grid Expansion]]<br/> |
Interventions should be regarded as part of a National Electrification Approache only if they are integral to governement electrification policy/strategy
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Technology
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Institutional reform will have an impact on all approaches to electrification and the associated technology categories. For grid extension, existing institutions have extensive experience of practices that may no longer be most appropriate for electrification in more areas. New practices may be required to increase levels of efficiency in order to make further grid extension a viable option, new expertise and knowledge may be needed to support adoption of new forms of electricity provision, and cultural change may be needed to achieve increased focus on supplying new users alongside serving existing customers. mini-grids, whether isolated or integrated with the grid, require different support structures to be effective, reliable and commercially viable. Stand-alone systems again offer a different approach to the aims of electrification, with the satisfaction of basic needs being the principle driver, rather than a full power service. This too requires a different institutional perspective, skills and understanding that can only be delivered through the reform of existing support structures.
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Delivery Models
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The institutions originally established to deal with power generation and supply were almost exclusively public sector, centred upon the national electricity utility. With the increasing cost of reaching more remote areas, the need for upfront investment has become a serious constraint to network expansion. Rural electrification also raises new challenges regarding the need for more intensive community interaction and closer management of the local operations. Consequently, the resources that can more readily be offered by the private sector – including the scale of investment and commercial management in order to make sufficient returns – are increasingly required. There is a growing need for private models and public-private-partnerships, which face the barrier of public institutions that have experience of a single method of providing access to electricity. The reform of these institutions, taking account of private sector interests, can thereby create opportunities for partnerships that will bring mutual benefits to all involved.
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Legual Basis
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Establishment of either or concessions or licenses for electricity provider implies a wish to bring in private or public-private electricity provision. Setting up these arrangements will require competent institutions with responsibility for managing them, and institutional restructuring is a likely response to this need and a first step in establishing new legal arrangements for electricity provision.
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Price/Tariff Regulation
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Similarly any form of price/tariff regulation requires a regulator. A regulator independent from government and those with vested interests in the sector will carry greatest credibility with potential new electricity providers and investors. Subsequent changes and adjustments to regulatory frameworks will be the responsibility of the regulator.
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Finance
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An institutional structure convincing to private sector businesses and investors is key to attracting private finance. It is also through this institutional structure that the interests of users are protected and the portion of funding provided by users set. The institutional structure also governs how any grant/subsidy, cross-subsidy, tax exemptions and guarantee arrangements are set up and implemented.
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Other Forms of Non-Financial Interventions
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The institutions charged with managing the sector and delivering electricity access will also be responsible for designing and managing non-financial interventions. One key element of institutional change will be to match the capabilities of staff to new requirements. Training to familiarise staff with new approaches, and to transfer the new skills required to provide the associated support will be an important requirement for any lasting reform process (and, if fulfilled adequately, will also incur a significant cost due to the large size of the institutions involved and the broad range of their activities – this should be budgeted in advance to set clear expectations). A first step in this process will be to educate staff regarding the need for reform, to convince them of the benefits, and so secure ownership and commitment to the change process. In the case that existing staff are unable or unwilling to adapt their approach, or when new skills are required to support modern demands, then the recruitment of new staff should be considered to establish the target capacity). Having raised the awareness and understanding of staff, they will become more receptive to the transfer of skills, equipping the institution with sufficient capacity to move forward, with minimum disruption.
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The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations. The categorization framework in the review tool is based on the EUEI/PDF / Practical Action publication "Building Energy Access Markets - A Value Chain Analysis of Key Energy Market Systems".
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights:
- Jeff Felten, AfDB - Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE - Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP - David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF - Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF - Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus - John Tkacik, REEEP - Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy - Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission - Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE - Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority - Mario Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF - Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF - Rebecca Symington, Mlinda Foundation - Marcel Raats, RVO.NL - Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder -