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| [[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] | | [[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] |
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| <span style="font-size: 13.6px">In many cases some other form(s) of public [[Portal:Financing and Funding|finance]] such as grants, subsidies, concessionary loans, tax exemptions or guarantees (to reduce investment risks) will be needed alongside private finance to overcome the lack of user spending power and the high costs of early market development.</span><span></span> | | <span style="font-size: 13.6px">In many cases some other form(s) of public [[Portal:Financing and Funding|finance]] such as grants, subsidies, concessionary loans, tax exemptions or guarantees (to reduce investment risks) will be needed alongside private finance to overcome the lack of user spending power and the high costs of early market development.</span><span></span> |
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− | '''''[[National Approaches to Electrification – Finance#User|User Finance]]''''' – Charges paid by users provide the means to repay electricity providers’ loans and equity investments and pay interest and return on capital. Where upfront charges are imposed on users, they may in turn seek to borrow to cover these charges and then repay the loan over time. Alternatively the electricity provider may seek additional finance in order to reduce up-front charges and so minimize barriers to users accessing their services. | + | '''''[[National Approaches to Electrification – Finance#User|User Finance]]''''' – Charges paid by users provide the means to repay electricity providers’ loans and equity investments and pay interest and return on capital. Where upfront charges are imposed on users, they may in turn seek to borrow to cover these charges and then repay the loan over time. Alternatively, the electricity provider may seek additional finance in order to reduce up-front charges and so minimize barriers to users accessing their services. |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span>[[Portal:Grid|Grid]] system construction and extension is highly capital intensive and almost all national grids (including those in developed countries) are constructed using public funding from government, sometimes supplemented by concessionary loans and grants from international agencies. The bulk of ongoing grid funding generally comes from users charges, but the grid is often seen as a national asset and electricity from it as a public good supporting national economic development, and governments may therefore choose to provide continuing subsidies either on a general basis, to incentivize extension to new users, or fund provision to specific groups of users (eg through lifeline tariffs). The primary [[Portal:Financing and Funding|financing]] for [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grids]] will generally align with the delivery model, with publically-owned mini-grids using public finance and privately owned mini-grids drawing on private finance. However, where incomes are lower or system costs higher, grants and /or subsidies are likely to be needed to make electricity from mini-grids affordable to users and the mini-grid businesses economically sustainable. Standalone systems are most frequently provided commercially and purchased directly by users. Grants may be used, as seen in the [[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]], to make systems more affordable to users, to enable providers to establish their businesses and to fund support activities. Where standalone system providers are moving towards pay-as-you-go arrangements their need for capital will increase and it may be more appropriate to channel grants and subsidies to them, allowing them to reduce monthly charges and charges to users for electricity used. Standalone systems may also, as can be seein in the [[NAE Case Study: South Africa, Integrated National Electrification|NAE Case Study South Africa]], be provided through a public delivery model and subsidized through that model. | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span>[[Portal:Grid|Grid]] system construction and extension is highly capital intensive and almost all national grids (including those in developed countries) are constructed using public funding from government, sometimes supplemented by concessionary loans and grants from international agencies. The bulk of ongoing grid funding generally comes from users charges, but the grid is often seen as a national asset and electricity from it as a public good supporting national economic development, and governments may therefore choose to provide continuing subsidies either on a general basis, to incentivize extension to new users, or fund provision to specific groups of users (eg through lifeline tariffs). The primary [[Portal:Financing and Funding|financing]] for [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grids]] will generally align with the delivery model, with publically-owned mini-grids using public finance and privately owned mini-grids drawing on private finance. However, where incomes are lower or system costs higher, grants and /or subsidies are likely to be needed to make electricity from mini-grids affordable to users and the mini-grid businesses economically sustainable. Standalone systems are most frequently provided commercially and purchased directly by users. Grants may be used, as seen in the [[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh]], to make systems more affordable to users, to enable providers to establish their businesses and to fund support activities. Where standalone system providers are moving towards pay-as-you-go arrangements their need for capital will increase and it may be more appropriate to channel grants and subsidies to them, allowing them to reduce monthly charges and charges to users for electricity used. Standalone systems may also, as can be seen in the [[NAE Case Study: South Africa, Integrated National Electrification|NAE Case Study South Africa]], be provided through a public delivery model and subsidized through that model. |
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| '''<span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span>Funds drawn from charges on one (usually existing or high income) group of users and used to subsidize provision to another (usually new or low-income) group of users. </span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span>''' | | '''<span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span>Funds drawn from charges on one (usually existing or high income) group of users and used to subsidize provision to another (usually new or low-income) group of users. </span><span></span><span></span><span></span><span></span>''' |
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− | <span>Cross subsidies may be established within electricity businesses, with the price/tariff structure being shaped to increase charges from some groups (eg commercial or higher-consuming household users) in order to allow prices or tariffs for others (eg industrial users or lower-consuming users) to be reduced. Alternatively mechanisms (such as an energy fund) may be established to take funding from one electricity provider or set of providers, whose underlying cost of provision is relatively low (eg the national [[Portal:Grid|grid]] company) to subsidize another set of providers. While cross subsidies may reduce costs and make electricity affordable for the users who benefit from them, they will inevitably increase costs for other users. Some element of cross-subsidy is inherent in any electricity business, simply because it is impractical to charge each user at their individual cost-recovery level. To enable effective cross-subsidy, it is essential to define groups of users which are as homogeneous as possible, to understand what the costs of provision to these groups are, and what alternative forms of electricity they may be able to access, in order to set appropriate prices or tariffs and cross-subsidy transfers. Any cross-subsidy arrangement which operates between providers will require government intervention. </span><br/> | + | <span>Cross subsidies may be established within electricity businesses, with the price/tariff structure being shaped to increase charges from some groups (eg commercial or higher-consuming household users) in order to allow prices or tariffs for others (eg industrial users or lower-consuming users) to be reduced. Alternatively, mechanisms (such as an energy fund) may be established to take funding from one electricity provider or set of providers, whose underlying cost of provision is relatively low (eg the national [[Portal:Grid|grid]] company) to subsidize another set of providers. While cross subsidies may reduce costs and make electricity affordable for the users who benefit from them, they will inevitably increase costs for other users. Some element of cross-subsidy is inherent in any electricity business, simply because it is impractical to charge each user at their individual cost-recovery level. To enable effective cross-subsidy, it is essential to define groups of users which are as homogeneous as possible, to understand what the costs of provision to these groups are, and what alternative forms of electricity they may be able to access, in order to set appropriate prices or tariffs and cross-subsidy transfers. Any cross-subsidy arrangement which operates between providers will require government intervention. </span><br/> |
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− | Active cross-subsidies are more likely to be put in place within a public delivery model, where the delivery organisation has social as well as [[Portal:Financing and Funding|financial]] objectives. In a private or public-private model cross-subsidies may be established either for social reasons (provided this does not threaten investor returns) or for commercial reasons (eg where a [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grid]] operator believes that commercial customers will be willing to pay for electricity at a higher price than the cost of supplying them, and this can be used to lower charges to and so increase demand from households, thus increasing overall revenues). Otherwise cross-subsidies are likely to be the result of regulatory action. | + | Active cross-subsidies are more likely to be put in place within a public delivery model, where the delivery organisation has social as well as [[Portal:Financing and Funding|financial]] objectives. In a private or public-private model cross-subsidies may be established either for social reasons (provided this does not threaten investor returns) or for commercial reasons (eg where a [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grid]] operator believes that commercial customers will be willing to pay for electricity at a higher price than the cost of supplying them, and this can be used to lower charges to and so increase demand from households, thus increasing overall revenues). Otherwise, cross-subsidies are likely to be the result of regulatory action. |
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− | Any cross-subsidies will be linked to price/tariff regulation. Where prices or tariffs are shaped to subsidize one group of users by increasing prices or tariffs for another group within a regulated electricity business, the price/tariff structure will require regulatory approval, and may be driven by regulatory requirements. Any cross-subsidies between providers will almost inevitably be driven by government or regulatory requirements. Either cross subsidies or grants or subsidies from outside the sector will be needed within any uniform price/tariff arrangement to prevent providers in higher cost areas or to higher cost groups becoming insolvent, while those with a lower cost base are enabled to make excess profits. Within an individual price/tariff regime, any cross-subsidies should be factored in to price/tariff calculations, and may be used to make electricity more affordable for those it is more costly to supply, and hence more equitable. | + | Any cross-subsidies will be linked to price/tariff regulation. Where prices or tariffs are shaped to subsidize one group of users by increasing prices or tariffs for another group within a regulated electricity business, the price/tariff structure will require regulatory approval, and may be driven by regulatory requirements. Any cross-subsidies between providers will almost inevitably be driven by government or regulatory requirements. Either cross subsidies or grants or subsidies from outside the sector will be needed within any uniform price/tariff arrangement to prevent providers in higher cost areas or to higher cost groups becoming insolvent, while those with a lower cost base are enabled to make excess profits. Within an individual price/tariff regime, any cross-subsidies should be factored into price/tariff calculations, and may be used to make electricity more affordable for those it is more costly to supply, and hence more equitable. |
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| There are advantages to project developers, investors, local communities and to Government from the provision of tax exemptions for activities related to electrification. For developers and their financiers, the reduced cost of system components and related materials means that projects can be more cost effective, with upfront costs reduced to provide lower investment risk – this can be the difference between the developer achieving access to [[Portal:Financing and Funding|finance]] and not. For local communities, electricity can be offered at a lower price since the costs have been reduced. And for Government, the reduced income from tax payments is may be balanced by the reduced need for Government expenditure to provide a basic service for remote households; the project developers can now meet this demand, which otherwise would have required the allocation of public services budget from the Government. | | There are advantages to project developers, investors, local communities and to Government from the provision of tax exemptions for activities related to electrification. For developers and their financiers, the reduced cost of system components and related materials means that projects can be more cost effective, with upfront costs reduced to provide lower investment risk – this can be the difference between the developer achieving access to [[Portal:Financing and Funding|finance]] and not. For local communities, electricity can be offered at a lower price since the costs have been reduced. And for Government, the reduced income from tax payments is may be balanced by the reduced need for Government expenditure to provide a basic service for remote households; the project developers can now meet this demand, which otherwise would have required the allocation of public services budget from the Government. |
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− | Tax exemptions may seem less painful than explicit grants and subsidies, since they do not require any payment from government, but they nevertheless represent a reduction in government revenues. This may also carry the downside of lack of transparency. Moreover tax exemptions represent a relatively blunt instrument and care must be taken to ensure that it is those who would not otherwise be able to afford electricity, and not the relatively affluent, who benefit. Most problems related to tax exemptions, however, arise from their implementation. Establishing clear criteria for their application can be difficult and lack of clarity (to the officials involved as well as to the potential recipients) can lead to inconsistency, delays, costs and frustrations that undermine the positive intentions. Implementation also requires awareness, cooperation and understanding of electrical technology and standards from officials such a customs officers who would not normally have much involvement or interest in the electricity sector. | + | Tax exemptions may seem less painful than explicit grants and subsidies, since they do not require any payment from government, but they nevertheless represent a reduction in government revenues. This may also carry the downside of lack of transparency. Moreover, tax exemptions represent a relatively blunt instrument and care must be taken to ensure that it is those who would not otherwise be able to afford electricity, and not the relatively affluent, who benefit. Most problems related to tax exemptions, however, arise from their implementation. Establishing clear criteria for their application can be difficult and lack of clarity (to the officials involved as well as to the potential recipients) can lead to inconsistency, delays, costs and frustrations that undermine the positive intentions. Implementation also requires awareness, cooperation and understanding of electrical technology and standards from officials such a customs officers who would not normally have much involvement or interest in the electricity sector. |
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| *<span><span><span>user payment risk – for instance for an isolated mini-grid operator. (This may include the risk that demand does not reach forecast levels or just that users fail to pay for electricity they receive.</span></span></span><br/> | | *<span><span><span>user payment risk – for instance for an isolated mini-grid operator. (This may include the risk that demand does not reach forecast levels or just that users fail to pay for electricity they receive.</span></span></span><br/> |
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− | <span><span><span><span>In more general terms, types of guarantee include:</span></span></span></span><br/>
| + | <span><span><span><span>In more general terms, types of guarantee include:</span></span></span></span><br/> |
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| <span><span><span><span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size: 13.6px">'''''Development Finance Guarantees''''' <span style="font-size: 13.6px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">– </span> may be offered by multilateral development banks and national development banks to assist with the implementation of projects in developing countries, particularly those that involve significant capital costs. Such guarantees provide any project developer, or the national Government of the country concerned, with security against the loss of funds due to unforeseen circumstances. For example, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is organized by the World Bank to help investors and lenders to deal with political risks by insuring eligible projects against losses relating to currency transfer restrictions, breach of contract, expropriation, war and civil disturbance. With this backing, there is a much greater chance that a developing country, or related project implementer, can attract and retain the necessary private investment.</span> | | <span><span><span><span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size: 13.6px">'''''Development Finance Guarantees''''' <span style="font-size: 13.6px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255)">– </span> may be offered by multilateral development banks and national development banks to assist with the implementation of projects in developing countries, particularly those that involve significant capital costs. Such guarantees provide any project developer, or the national Government of the country concerned, with security against the loss of funds due to unforeseen circumstances. For example, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is organized by the World Bank to help investors and lenders to deal with political risks by insuring eligible projects against losses relating to currency transfer restrictions, breach of contract, expropriation, war and civil disturbance. With this backing, there is a much greater chance that a developing country, or related project implementer, can attract and retain the necessary private investment.</span> |
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| {{NAE Acknowledgements}} | | {{NAE Acknowledgements}} |
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− | [[Category:Microfinance]]
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− | [[Category:Off-grid]]
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− | [[Category:Mini-grid]]
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− | [[Category:Grid]]
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− | [[Category:Financing_Grid]]
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− | [[Category:Financing_and_Funding]]
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− | [[Category:Energy_Access]]
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| [[Category:NAE]] | | [[Category:NAE]] |
| + | [[Category:Energy_Access]] |
| + | [[Category:Financing_and_Funding]] |
| + | [[Category:Financing_Grid]] |
| + | [[Category:Grid]] |
| + | [[Category:Mini-grid]] |
| + | [[Category:Off-grid]] |
| + | [[Category:Microfinance]] |
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Technology
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Grid system construction and extension is highly capital intensive and almost all national grids (including those in developed countries) are constructed using public funding from government, sometimes supplemented by concessionary loans and grants from international agencies. The bulk of ongoing grid funding generally comes from users charges, but the grid is often seen as a national asset and electricity from it as a public good supporting national economic development, and governments may therefore choose to provide continuing subsidies either on a general basis, to incentivize extension to new users, or fund provision to specific groups of users (eg through lifeline tariffs). The primary financing for mini-grids will generally align with the delivery model, with publically-owned mini-grids using public finance and privately owned mini-grids drawing on private finance. However, where incomes are lower or system costs higher, grants and /or subsidies are likely to be needed to make electricity from mini-grids affordable to users and the mini-grid businesses economically sustainable. Standalone systems are most frequently provided commercially and purchased directly by users. Grants may be used, as seen in the NAE Case Study of the IDCOL programme in Bangladesh, to make systems more affordable to users, to enable providers to establish their businesses and to fund support activities. Where standalone system providers are moving towards pay-as-you-go arrangements their need for capital will increase and it may be more appropriate to channel grants and subsidies to them, allowing them to reduce monthly charges and charges to users for electricity used. Standalone systems may also, as can be seen in the NAE Case Study South Africa, be provided through a public delivery model and subsidized through that model.
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Delivery Model
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By definition, any public delivery model will use public finance - effectively government (and international ) grants and subsidies – combined with finance from users, while a purely private delivery model must be purely privately financed (since inclusion of any grants or subsidies finance would cause the delivery model to be categorized as a public-private partnership). All public-private partnership models will involve a combination of private and public finance, frequently through explicit grants and subsidies (or tax exemptions or guarantees) or through partial public ownership acting as a form of grant /subsidy.
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Legal Basis
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A concession may be used as a means of channelling grants or subsidies into electricity provision through the terms of the concession agreement. A license would not generally be linked directly to a grant or subsidy, but may be one of the qualifying requirements for accessing them. Grants and subsidies will most often be linked to some form of regulation to ensure proper use of funds.
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Price/Tariff Regulation
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Any price/tariff regulation must factor in grants or subsidies received by the electricity business, so that their effect is to reduce prices or tariffs and make electricity more affordable to users. This also serves to ensure proper use of public funding and so where grants and subsidies are made available, prices or tariffs are more likely to be regulated. Where combined with a uniform price/tariff arrangement, grants and subsidies may make electricity access more affordable, but if they, too, are set on a uniform basis, while they may extend the group of users to whom electricity can be economically provided, they are also likely to create additional excess profits for those elements of electricity provision which could have been delivered economically at a lower subsidy level. This implies that where uniform prices or tariffs are used, grants or subsidies should be structured to reflect costs of provision. Where prices or tariffs are set on an individual basis, the prices/tariffs themselves can be made cost-reflective. Where prices/tariffs are unregulated, it is left to market competition to ensure that grants and subsidies are passed to the users rather than unnecessarily retained by the business to boost profits to excessive levels.
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Other Forms of Finance
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Private Finance – private finance will depend upon the investor’s (or lender’s) assessment of the financial return and the level of risk involved. Grants and subsidies can directly increase probable return and reduce risk by off-setting costs and increasing demand by making electricity affordable for more users. Indirectly grant-funded technical assistance, local capacity-building, awareness-raising, and promotion of uses of electricity by potential customers can also make investment in electricity access more attractive to private financiers.
User Finance – grants or subsidies paid to users provide one source of user finance, allowing users to off-set up-front and/or ongoing charges. Grants and subsidies paid to electricity businesses have the same effect indirectly. Because grants and subsidies do not require repayment they provide an absolute reduction in users’ need to secure other forms of finance, not just a timing shift.
Cross-Subsidies – sit alongside grants and subsidies as finance which is not derived from commercial investment in the specific electricity provider or payments from the users being supplied. They may therefore be seen as an alternative to grants and subsidies, but it must be recalled that they are taken from other businesses and users and so, unlike grants and subsidies simply redistribute the costs of electricity rather than reducing them
Tax exemptions and Guarantees – Act as indirect forms of grant or subsidy by reducing costs and risks
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Non-Financial Interventions
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Direct provision of electricity can act as a vehicle for grants and subsidies if it is undertaken at below cost, or if it uses funding (eg from the public purse) which is not required to be repaid. Grants may be used to fund other non-financial interventions, such as technical assistance and awareness raising. (Non-financial interventions undertaken at no cost to the electricity provider could also be regarded as grants or subsidies, but are not treated as such in categorizing NEA).
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The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations. The categorization framework in the review tool is based on the EUEI/PDF / Practical Action publication "Building Energy Access Markets - A Value Chain Analysis of Key Energy Market Systems".
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights:
- Jeff Felten, AfDB - Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE - Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP - David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF - Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF - Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus - John Tkacik, REEEP - Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy - Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission - Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE - Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority - Mario Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF - Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF - Rebecca Symington, Mlinda Foundation - Marcel Raats, RVO.NL - Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder -